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On that basis, the Court determined that an indigent father facing a year in jail was
not entitled to a public defender. The Court’s analysis reflects a broader and widespread assumption that family law is a civil field. Recent scholarship has challenged that understanding by examining how criminal law and family law work in
tandem to police certain conduct. This Article goes further by demonstrating that
modern support duties and the family courts that enforce them evolved from criminal laws and courts.
Relying on extensive historical research, this Article argues that child support
enforcement is criminal law in a civil guise. Family nonsupport was criminalized
around the turn of the twentieth century to permit extradition of offenders. Criminal
court judges then tasked newly minted probation officers with reconciling, investigating, and monitoring families—novel state interventions in domestic life. Probation officers, in turn, staffed and promoted specialized criminal nonsupport courts
(initially called “domestic relations courts” and later “family courts”) that some cities
opened to handle these prosecutions in the 1910s. Beginning in the 1930s, costs and
stigma associated with criminal law led legislators to strategically relabel family
courts and support enforcement as “civil,” even while retaining procedures, personnel, and powers drawn from the criminal context. Observers found the ongoing use
of criminal-derived oversight methods unobjectionable; the decades in which support law was largely criminal law shifted norms about acceptable and desirable
state involvement in family relationships. As the number of civil “child support”
suits surpassed nonsupport prosecutions (which all states retained) and probation
officers disappeared from family litigation, the criminal heritage and continued
criminal-law reinforcement of family courts and support laws were obscured.
The calculated and incomplete conversion of family support enforcement from
criminal to civil undercuts the supposedly distinct purposes, procedures, and penalties associated with the civil and criminal categories. Building on scholarship that
critiques the Supreme Court’s treatment of statutory schemes that blur the civilcriminal divide, the Article draws from child support history to condemn the Court’s
strong deference to legislative labels and to propose greater consideration of enforcement methods. If the Court were persuaded to recognize child support incarceration
as a criminal sanction, then states would face a difficult choice. They could either
allocate the resources needed for constitutionally mandated criminal procedure protections or decriminalize the enforcement machinery—ideally through elimination
of most child support incarceration.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 2011 case of Turner v Rogers, the United States
Supreme Court held that a father jailed for a year by a family
court judge for nonpayment of child support was not entitled to a
public defender.1 The defendant in that case, Michael Turner, was
one of the millions of Americans who are party to a child support
order. Today these parents collectively owe more than $30 billion
annually.2 Over $100 billion in child support payments is overdue, and thousands of child support debtors are in jail.3
Most child support cases are heard in specialized domestic
relations or family courts that also have jurisdiction over other
family litigation, such as divorce and child custody.4 Each year
there are more than five million domestic relations suits, comprising over 10 percent of state court dockets.5 Family-related litigation is thus many Americans’ most direct and important contact
with the legal system. 6 Scholars and practitioners have found
1

Turner v Rogers, 564 US 431, 435 (2011).
Timothy Grall, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2013 *11
(United States Department of Commerce, Jan 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/28UD-59YV.
3
Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor:
The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 95, 106–07, 116–17 (2008).
4
On variations in modern family court jurisdiction, see Barbara A. Babb, Reevaluating Where We Stand: A Comprehensive Survey of America’s Family Justice Systems, 46
Fam Ct Rev 230, 232–33 (2008).
5
Richard Y. Schauffler, et al, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Overview of
2015 State Court Caseloads *3, 10 (National Center for State Courts, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/34A6-M2AC (statistic excludes traffic cases). Around 30 percent of domestic relations matters are support suits or closely related paternity cases. Id at *10.
6
Countless other families make decisions without state intervention yet subject to
the norms established through litigated cases; in the language of a classic law review article, people who pursue private agreements “bargain in the shadow of the law.” Robert H.
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950, 968 (1979).
2
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that, despite family courts’ importance, these tribunals suffer
from poor resources, limited access to counsel, low-status judges,
and inadequate procedures.7
In Turner, the justices began from the premise that they were
evaluating the procedural protections warranted in a civil proceeding. The Court unquestioningly accepted that Turner’s
minutes-long appearance before a South Carolina family court
was a “civil contempt hearing.”8 On that basis, the justices reasoned that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply.9
The majority instead applied a civil balancing test and concluded
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required only “alternative procedural safeguards.”10 The dissenters
likewise found no Due Process right to counsel. Two dissenters
went further, critiquing the majority’s opinion for insufficiently
considering “the interests of the child and custodial parent, who
is usually the child’s mother.”11 Referring to obstacles to collecting
support from “deadbeat dads,” they credited states’ claim that
civil contempt imprisonment is a “highly effective tool for collecting child support when nothing else works.”12
Turner has provided rich fodder for a range of legal commentary that also assumes that incarceration for child support nonpayment is civil in nature. The case has become a leading example
of the need for improved access to justice and perhaps a civil
Gideon.13 It also serves as a centerpiece in family law literature

7
Jane C. Murphy and Jana B. Singer, Divorced from Reality: Rethinking Family
Dispute Resolution 102 (NYU 2015) (noting that a majority of family litigants have no
access to counsel); Deborah Chase and Peggy Fulton Hora, The Best Seat in the House:
The Court Assignment and Judicial Satisfaction, 47 Fam Ct Rev 209, 212–13 (2009) (summarizing criticism of family courts).
8
Turner, 564 US at 436, 438.
9
Id at 441–42.
10 Id at 444–45, 448, citing Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 (1976) and Lassiter
v Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 27–31 (1981).
11 Turner, 564 US at 458 (Thomas dissenting).
12 Id at 459–60 (quotation marks omitted).
13 See generally Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963). For a particularly helpful
treatment that situates Turner in a longer history of related advocacy, see Kelly Terry,
The Movement for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Turner v. Rogers (2011), in Ezra
Rosser and Marie Failinger, eds, The Poverty Law Canon 256–73 (2016). See also, for example, Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons
from Domestic and International Law, 122 Yale L J 2260, 2268–72 (2013) (“[T]he Turner
Court’s references to equality considerations reflect the Court’s intuitive understanding
that inequality in access to the courts might distort the checks and balances underlying
our democratic system.”); Richard M. Re, “Equal Right to the Poor”, 84 U Chi L Rev 1149,
1195–96 & n 228 (2017). Civil procedure casebooks include Turner in discussing access to
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that critiques the harmful consequences of child support enforcement on poor and minority fathers and their families. 14 More
broadly, child support enforcement features in discussions of the
seeming return of debtors’ prison and mass incarceration.15
This Article challenges the widespread understanding of
child support laws as civil, an intervention with profound consequences for the treatment of support cases and analysis of the
civil-criminal divide. Extensive archival research reveals that the
civil label obscures a system born in and backed by criminal law.
Today’s child support obligations are enforced in specialized family courts that retain procedures developed when these tribunals
primarily oversaw criminal nonsupport cases.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, lawmakers
criminalized family nonsupport, applied probation supervision to
offenders, and segregated nonsupport cases in specialized domestic relations courts. Together these developments allowed the
state to intervene more directly and coercively in securing family
financial support than had previously been possible. Criminal enforcement also brought downsides including costs and stigma that
some reformers wished to reduce. Beginning in the 1930s, lawmakers strategically rebranded criminal nonsupport prosecutions and the courts that heard them as “civil.” At the same time,
they preserved essential elements—state employee monitoring
and enforcement, as well as incarceration (technically via civil
contempt)—cultivated in the criminal context. States also retained criminal law for deterrence and to use in the most egregious cases. This incomplete shift from criminal to civil set the
foundation for today’s purportedly civil approach to support

justice. See, for example, Barbara Allen Babcock, Toni M. Massaro, and Norman W.
Spaulding, Civil Procedure: Cases and Problems 91–103 (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed 2017).
14 See, for example, Tonya L. Brito, Fathers behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J Gender Race & Just
617, 668–69 (2012); Daniel L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 BU L Rev 897, 911–13 (2013).
These articles contribute to a rich and growing literature on law and fatherhood. See generally,
for example, Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family
Inequalities, 102 Va L Rev 79 (2016); Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and
Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 Yale L J 2292 (2016).
15 See, for example, Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 Seattle U L Rev 927, 933–35 (2016)
(explaining disproportionate targeting of racial minorities for enforcement of failure to
pay); Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 Georgetown J Poverty L &
Pol 127, 142–46 (2011).
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enforcement. With its decision in Turner, the Supreme Court endorsed this obfuscation, allowing the state’s label to limit procedural protections.
In unearthing the criminal origins of family courts and support laws, this Article contributes to historical and modern understandings of family law. While two historians have contributed perceptive work on the passage and enforcement of criminal
nonsupport statutes and the related creation of specialized domestic relations courts from the 1890s into the 1930s, these accounts are temporally and geographically limited and have not
been incorporated into family law scholarship.16 Law review articles cover child support in the nineteenth century and then skip
to the mid-twentieth, omitting the critical period in which nonpayment often prompted criminal prosecution.17 Some work condemns early domestic relations courts based on the erroneous
claim that these tribunals decriminalized domestic violence.18 Legal scholars interested in family courts for their procedural innovations have contributed insightful accounts, yet this work does

16 Anna R. Igra, Wives without Husbands: Marriage, Desertion, & Welfare in New
York, 1900-1935 (UNC 2007); Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago 128–71 (Cambridge 2003); Anna R. Igra, Likely to Become a Public
Charge: Deserted Women and the Family Law of the Poor in New York City, 1910–1936, 11
J Women Hist 59 (2000); Michael Willrich, Home Slackers: Men, the State, and Welfare in
Modern America, 87 J Am Hist 460 (2000). For an account of midcentury family court
development, see J. Herbie DiFonzo, Beneath the Fault Line: The Popular and Legal Culture of Divorce in Twentieth-Century America 122 (UVA 1997) (casting family courts as an
unsuccessful stop on the road to no-fault divorce). See also Theodore Fadlo Boushy, The
Historical Development of the Domestic Relations Court (unpublished PhD dissertation,
The University of Oklahoma, 1950) (on file with author). Though many scholars cite
Willrich’s City of Courts for general histories of court reform and specialization, Westlaw
shows only nine articles citing this book or Home Slackers for discussion of nonsupport
cases, with eight of these appearing in the Law and History Review or Law & Social Inquiry. (The only exception is Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23
Yale J L & Humanities 189, 246 n 210 (2011).) Of the eight history articles, two are the
only legal scholarship to cite Igra.
17 A commonly cited piece on child support history is Drew D. Hansen, Note, The
American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punishment in Early American
Child Support Law, 108 Yale L J 1123 (1999), building on Donna Schuele, Origins and
Development of the Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J Fam L 807 (1988). While Hansen’s
Note offers some helpful points, the author’s analysis is at times misleading because of the
focus on divorced fathers, a small subset of the men held responsible for family support in
this period. Hansen, Note, 108 Yale L J at 1125 n 14. Moreover, the attention to child
support is somewhat anachronistic because more children were supported through undifferentiated awards that also included their mothers.
18 See, for example, Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 Vand L Rev 1015, 1040 (2014) (relying on popular
accounts).
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not seek to intervene in understandings of family law.19 These disconnects leave the widespread impression that modern family
courts belong under the civil umbrella.20 Indeed, it is this understanding of family courts as civil that underlies one of the most
contentious debates on their jurisdiction today—whether it is appropriate to place domestic violence cases within (implicitly civil)
family courts.21
By bringing together and greatly supplementing existing historical and legal treatments of child support and family courts,
this account embraces and extends scholars’ capacious conception
of “family law.” The family law canon, leaders in the field have
persuasively argued, should include topics as wide-ranging as immigration, welfare, and zoning, to name just a few.22 Though one
facet of this broadening effort has been to explore how family law
and criminal law have worked in tandem to police certain familyrelated conduct (especially sexual relations and domestic violence), experts continue to decry an underappreciation of how

19 Amy J. Cohen, The Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J Disp Res 91, 100–03
(2011) (describing family court history in the development of alternative dispute resolution); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts,
22 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol 473, 478–79, 488–94 (2015) (using family court as example of a “quintessential poor people’s court” and examining the negative implications of
“informality and interventionism”). See also Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46
Fam Ct Rev 258, 266–68 (2008) (using family court history to question promise of modern
problem-solving courts).
20 See, for example, David W. Neubauer and Henry F. Fradella, America’s Courts
and the Criminal Justice System 97 (Wadsworth 10th ed 2011) (“[D]omestic relations cases
constitute the fastest-growing part of the civil caseload.”); Lawrence Baum, American
Courts: Process and Policy 43 (Houghton Mifflin 6th ed 2008) (in table of courts, including
“Domestic (civil)”).
21 Many discussants argue that domestic violence belongs in family courts so judges
can treat each family holistically, while others insist that these matters should be heard
with other assault charges in criminal courts for legal, practical, and symbolic reasons.
Some jurisdictions have experimented with courts that hear only domestic violence cases.
For thoughtful voices in these discussions, see generally Erin R. Collins, The Evidentiary
Rules of Engagement in the War against Domestic Violence, 90 NYU L Rev 397 (2015); Adi
Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 111 Nw U L Rev 1205 (2017); and Elizabeth L.
MacDowell, When Courts Collide: Integrated Domestic Violence Courts and Court Pluralism, 20 Tex J Women & L 95 (2011).
22 See generally Kerry Abrams, Book Review, Family History: Inside and Out, 111
Mich L Rev 1001 (2013); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan L Rev 825
(2004); Janet Halley, 23 Yale J L & Humanities 189 (cited in note 16); Janet Halley and
Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 Am J Comp L 753 (2010).
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these areas of law interrelate.23 Criminal regulation of marital behaviors is still perceived as the exception historically24 and as a
recent, hard-fought change.25 This Article joins scholarship studying the nexus between family law and criminal law and breaks
new ground by showing that criminal law and family law have
not merely acted together—some criminal laws and courts became
family laws and courts.
That criminal law targeted family support obligations also
challenges a broader conventional wisdom about “family privacy.” 26 Family law casebooks and scholarship routinely cite a
1953 Nebraska civil case for the proposition that marital finances
have been impervious to state regulation because of judicial reticence to meddle in the affairs of intact families.27 When scholars
acknowledge court regulation of family finances, they often emphasize a “dual system” in which poor families are subject to
23 Professor Melissa Murray writes that family law and criminal law “are strange
bedfellows whose interaction is frequently overlooked.” Murray’s insightful intervention
is to examine how criminal law worked “alongside” and “in tandem” with family law to
regulate “the normative content of intimate life.” Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows:
Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 Iowa L Rev
1253, 1255, 1257, 1272 (2009). See also Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112
Colum L Rev 1, 23–37 (2012) (arguing that marriage operated as a punishment when
criminal law fell short in seduction suits). Other scholarship discussing the criminal regulation of intimate life includes Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 Va L Rev 1 (1998)
and Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 Cal L
Rev 1373 (2000). For a recent contribution focused on parent-child relationships, see generally Cynthia Godsoe, Redrawing the Boundaries of Relational Crime, 69 Ala L Rev 169
(2017) (challenging limited nexus that scholars have recognized between family law and
criminal law by studying corporal punishment and incest laws). Related scholarship studies how family relationships burden or benefit defendants in the criminal justice system—
see generally, for example, Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins, and Ethan J. Leib, Privilege
or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties (Oxford 2009)—and the negative consequences of criminal law on families—see generally, for example, Andrea L.
Dennis, Criminal Law as Family Law, 33 Ga St U L Rev 285 (2017).
24 Murray, 94 Iowa L Rev at 1258–64 (cited in note 23) (identifying and critiquing
this perception).
25 For a challenge to the common claim that criminal law did not address spousal
domestic violence until the 1960s, see generally Elizabeth Katz, Judicial Patriarchy and
Domestic Violence: A Challenge to the Conventional Family Privacy Narrative, 21 Wm &
Mary J Women & L 379 (2015).
26 This aspect of the Article contributes to Halley’s critique of Family Law Exceptionalism by recovering the “economic family.” Previous contributions to this discussion have not
considered criminal law. See Halley and Rittich, 58 Am J Comp L at 758 (cited in note 22).
27 The case is McGuire v McGuire, 59 NW2d 336 (Neb 1953). For a representative
example of its use, see Brian Bix, The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Family Law 16–
18 (Oxford 2013). But see Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,
18 U Mich J L Ref 835, 842 (1985) (challenging “the basic coherence of the concepts intervention and nonintervention . . . because the state constantly defines and redefines the
family”).
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harsher intrusions.28 This Article’s examination of criminal support enforcement—applied to families with varied degrees of togetherness and at a range of income levels—disrupts this neat
binary as well as the overall notion of family privacy.29
Beyond the family law context, criminal law’s formative role
in modern family support laws and courts contributes to discussion about the blurring of the civil-criminal divide. Although
criminal law (in which the state brings a prosecution to protect
the public and rehabilitate/punish a wrongdoer) and civil law
(which typically involves a private party initiating suit to seek
redress of a harm) are generally discussed and taught as discrete
subjects, scholars have identified myriad ways in which the line
is sometimes unclear because of government involvement or
seemingly extreme consequences in matters labeled “civil.” This
scholarship often focuses on US Supreme Court cases, emphasizes changes in recent decades (sometimes suggesting this is a
contemporary phenomenon), and applies philosophical or other
theoretical lenses.30
This Article enriches civil-criminal discussions by providing
a distinct and concrete example for consideration: state legislatures’ deliberate and sustained crafting of a criminal-civil hybrid.
The intermingled public and private goals of family support enforcement afforded lawmakers the flexibility to draw their preferred elements from civil and criminal law. They could cite the
need to reduce reliance on charity and welfare, reinforce desirable
(and in practice gendered) parental and marital behaviors, and

28 The classic account is Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law:
Its Origin, Development, and Present Status: Part I, 16 Stan L Rev 257 (1964).
29 While acknowledging that poor families were disproportionately subject to criminal enforcement of support duties, this Article pushes back against “dual system” descriptions that overlook the state’s coercive power over families not on welfare. In doing so, it
joins the helpful analyses offered by Dinner, 102 Va L Rev at 82–83 (cited in note 14);
Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash between Custody and
Child Support, 42 Ind L Rev 611, 618–21 (2009); and Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support
Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of
the State, 42 Wake Forest L Rev 1029, 1035–44 (2007). See also June Carbone and Naomi
Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 Mich St L Rev 1185.
30 Commonly cited articles include John C. Coffee Jr, Paradigms Lost: The Blurring
of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L J
1875 (1992); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 Buff Crim L Rev
679 (1999); David A. Sklansky and Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law without Leaving
Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94
Georgetown L J 683 (2006); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Georgetown L J 775 (1997).
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bolster family relationships—all of which included public and private elements. Through decades of pragmatic and creative blending, lawmakers fashioned a criminal-style law in a civil guise, an
exercise that undercuts assumptions about the supposedly
distinct purposes, procedures, and penalties in civil and
criminal law.
The Article proceeds chronologically, using newspaper articles, court reports, conference proceedings, and cases to recover
the criminal origins of family courts and the financial obligations
they impose. Because the dates, speed, and comprehensiveness of
reform varied by location, this Article focuses on nationwide developments and influential trendsetters, acknowledging variation
when doing so adds relevant nuance. The first Part explains that
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, men’s increasing mobility prompted charity leaders to advocate for the
criminalization of family support duties in order to gain access to
extradition. These reformers favored misdemeanors over felonies,
initiating a century-long effort to categorize family support duties
in whatever manner promised the most advantageous combination of high coercion and reach with low process and cost. Once
nonsupport was criminalized, reformers faced the question of how
to translate a conviction into financial support for dependents.
Here they turned to newly appointed probation officers to investigate, rehabilitate, and oversee offenders.31
To facilitate the enforcement of criminal nonsupport laws,
Part II continues, many large cities opened specialized “domestic
relations courts” beginning in the 1910s. These courts depended
on probation officers, who in turn pushed their nascent organizations, most notably the National Probation Association (NPA), to
advocate for the spread and expansion of the courts. In this symbiotic relationship, the success of probation as a profession was
tied to the scope and resources of the domestic relations courts,
while the effectiveness of the courts and power of the judges
turned on the availability and abilities of probation officers. Probation-backed, criminal domestic relations courts introduced a
greater level of state intervention in family behavior, and especially family finances, than had previously been possible.32
31

See Part I.
See Part II. The canonical book on probation’s early years is inattentive to the
categories of adult cases that received probation treatment and therefore misses the crucial role family courts played in employing probation officers and validating probation’s
methods. David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives
32
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Part III explores how perceived drawbacks to criminal law
inspired innovative approaches from the 1930s through 1950s.
New York took the lead by creating a “civil” nonsupport offense
that retained criminal enforcement mechanisms: probationary
oversight and incarceration. So that these civil statutes could
reach across state lines, all states passed reciprocal enforcement
laws by the mid-1950s. Under the new civil regime, the state used
criminal-style powers and provided multifaceted oversight to ensure compliance, a situation that most observers found unremarkable after becoming accustomed to deep court involvement
in the criminal context. The half century in which family support
law was largely criminal law had shifted societal norms regarding
acceptable intervention of the state in family relationships. Although all states retained criminal statutes for deterrence and to
use in the most condemnable cases, the criminal-derived civil law
was so efficient that criminal prosecutions were rarely
necessary.33
Because of their shifting caseload, family courts soon appeared to be civil tribunals. Further disconnecting family courts
from their criminal origins, inadequate funding and expanding
dockets caused the role of probation officer to gradually dissolve
into a bureaucratic and impersonal system that focused solely on
overseeing support payments, in contrast to the supposedly rehabilitative oversight of earlier years. The civil facade crystallized
just before the Warren Court initiated the criminal procedure revolution, which may explain why family courts missed the scrutiny
the Court applied to their cousin institution, juvenile courts.34 Despite changes in the following decades—most importantly the
continued spread and jurisdictional diversification of family
in Progressive America (HarperCollins 1980) (arguing that cities absorbed the costs of probation, despite recognition of the method’s shortcomings, because it facilitated plea bargaining). For perceptive scholarship that discusses the importance and operation of modern probation and relies on Rothman’s account for historical background, see Philip
Goodman, Joshua Page, and Michelle Phelps, Breaking the Pendulum: The Long Struggle
over Criminal Justice 55–56 (Oxford 2017); Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good:
Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 Georgetown L J 291, 328–29 (2016);
Michelle S. Phelps, Mass Probation: Toward a More Robust Theory of State Variation in
Punishment, 19 Punishment & Soc 53, 67 (2017).
33 See Parts III.A–B.
34 In In re Gault, 387 US 1 (1967), the Supreme Court looked to history and the overall context of juvenile courts when it found that “civil” juvenile delinquency proceedings
that can lead to incarceration do qualify for state-appointed legal counsel. The Turner
majority distinguished Gault with minimal explanation, Turner, 564 US at 443, which is
especially striking because of the interrelated development of juvenile and family courts.
See Part II.
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courts, a narrowed focus on child rather than family support, a
gradual willingness to treat “illegitimate” children like those born
to married spouses, and the growing involvement of the federal
government—the blended criminal-civil approach remains in
place.35
By connecting criminal domestic relations courts and nonsupport prosecutions to modern family courts and child support
proceedings, this Article shows that a substantial component of
family law has long been criminal law. Part IV begins with an
overview of why the ongoing criminal-style enforcement of child
support orders is concerning for practical and principled reasons.
Political efforts and Turner have proven inadequate to prompt
meaningful change, so the Article suggests that asking the Court
to recognize the criminal nature of child support incarceration
could forge a new path. It is unclear how the Court would respond
to this argument. Scholars agree that the Court’s treatment of
statutory schemes that blur the civil-criminal divide is flawed.
Lessons from the child support account could help improve the
Court’s civil-criminal test by counseling against deferring to state
labels and by demonstrating the relevance of enforcement machinery to the analysis. The labeling of child support incarceration as a criminal sanction would force states to make a difficult
choice. They could either allocate the resources needed for criminal procedure protections or (more productively) truly decriminalize child support enforcement by eliminating the routine use of
incarceration.36
I. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MEN’S FAMILY SUPPORT DUTIES
(1895–1920S)
This Part explains why charity leaders led an effort to criminalize men’s family support duties beginning in the late nineteenth century. Though moral condemnation and a desire for
harsher punishment were factors,37 this Part argues that the primary motivation for criminalization was the need for extradition
in order to reach delinquent breadwinners across state lines.
While reformers agreed that family nonsupport should be criminalized, they debated whether the offense should be a misdemeanor or

35

See Part III.C and Part IV.A.
See Part IV.
37 Willrich, City of Courts at 147–49 (cited in note 16); Willrich, 87 J Am Hist at 464,
473 (cited in note 16).
36
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a felony, ultimately favoring the former for strategic reasons. After
criminalization, courts turned to newly appointed probation officers to supervise nonsupporters and ensure that the men provided
weekly payments to their dependents. Although the criminalization of family support duties appeared problematic to some defendants and judges, nearly every objection to the scheme failed.
The blended public-private purpose of family support enforcement seemingly justified the use of states’ criminal powers.
A. Shortcomings of Civil and Poor Law Support Enforcement
Prior to the passage of criminal nonsupport laws, a wife could
obtain financial support from her husband for herself and their
children through three legal approaches: the doctrine of necessaries, a legal separation, and poor law.38 Derived from a blend of
common law, state statutes, and equity, these options provided
remedies to many dependents. Judges and legislators continually
revised these laws to better fit evolving social and economic
circumstances.39 Nevertheless, by the late nineteenth century, all
three methods failed to secure support from the growing group of
men whose only assets were weekly wages and who were increasingly mobile due to improvements in transportation.40
The legal starting point for the regulation of marital obligations was the common law doctrine of coverture, under which a
38 Because most family support litigation in this period involved spouses and marital
children, this account does not directly consider the “bastardy” law that governed support of
“illegitimate” children in some states. It is possible the quasi-criminal status of bastardy laws
provided comforting precedent to legal reformers who sought a quasi-criminal or fully criminal statute to address the arguably analogous nonsupport of marital children, but reformers
did not openly draw this connection and some judges dismissed such comparisons. See, for
example, State v Schweitzer, 18 A 787, 787–89 (Conn 1889) (bastardy’s status as noncriminal
did not indicate nonsupport was noncriminal). For representative discussion of bastardy’s
quasi-criminal status, see People v Phalen, 13 NW 830, 831 (Mich 1882) (Bastardy proceedings “cannot be classed as strictly criminal or civil in their nature but partake somewhat of
the elements of both. They are quasi criminal in so far as the aim is to protect the public.”)
(emphasis in original). For an overview of bastardy laws, see Chester Vernier, 4 American
Family Laws: A Comparative Study of the Family Law of the Forty-Eight American States,
Alaska, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii (to Jan. 1, 1935) 206–19 (Stanford 1936). As
late as 1940, fewer than 4 percent of births were to unwed mothers. Stephanie J. Ventura
and Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1949–99 (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Oct 18, 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/B24V-2RD3.
Legal treatment of children born out of wedlock drew attention in later decades. See, for
example, Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform
Act on Legitimacy, 44 Tex L Rev 829, 848–54 (1966).
39 The most comprehensive overview is L. Neville Brown, Family Maintenance and
Its Enforcement in the United States, 13 Intl & Comp L Q 139 (1964).
40 See Parts I.A–B.
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husband and wife were one legal person. Coverture imposed
rights and duties on both members of a couple. The husband, as
head of the household, was required to support his family. The
wife, in turn, pledged to obey her husband and serve him with her
labor.41 The husband had the right to choose the family’s domicile
and, because spouses were expected to live together, this meant
the wife had to follow her husband to a new home unless his
wrongful conduct justified her in living apart.42
Because coverture typically did not allow a wife to contract or
own property, the traditional way a married woman could make
purchases was pursuant to the “doctrine of necessaries.” Under a
simple application of the doctrine, a wife bought items on credit
from a merchant, who then recovered the cost from her husband.43
“Necessaries” included food, clothing, housing, and household
items “such as would be proper for the station, tastes, standing,
and financial ability of the husband and wife.”44 The necessaries
doctrine benefitted children indirectly, as a mother’s necessaries
purchases could include items for the couple’s children.45 Whether
and to what extent a parent could be held liable for necessaries
purchased directly by or for a child was a more difficult question,
but judges developed case law that generally held a father liable.46
While a commonplace approach, not all women and children
benefitted from the necessaries doctrine because it typically required a merchant to trust that a man would pay his dependents’
bills. If a husband refused to pay, the merchant sued him to recover. At trial, the merchant bore the risk that a judge or jury
would conclude that the items were not actually necessary or that

41 Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 11–13
(Harvard 2000).
42 James Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 35 at 64–65, § 37
at 67 (Little, Brown 1895).
43 Scholars have argued that the doctrine of necessaries was ineffectual. While my
own research challenges this literature, for purposes of this Article, it suffices to observe
that the doctrine did not help a growing subset of dependents. See, for example, Hendrik
Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History 156–60 (Harvard 2000).
44 W.C. Rodgers, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 221 at 183 (TH Flood
& Co 1899); Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 61 at 99
(cited in note 42).
45 Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 71 at 118
(cited in note 42).
46 See, for example, Yarborough v Yarborough, 290 US 202, 207–08 (1933). See also
W.R. Vance, The Parent’s Liability for Necessaries Furnished His Minor Child, 6 Va L Reg
585, 592–96 (1901) (comparing English and American cases); Case Note, Parent and
Child—Support of Child—Liability of Father—Rogers v. Rogers, 24 Yale L J 170 (1914).
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the wife was not eligible to purchase on the husband’s credit because they lived apart for reasons that were her fault.47 Thus, although courts and legislatures modified aspects of the doctrine to
enhance its availability and usefulness, this approach did not uniformly secure access to support.48 The doctrine provided the greatest benefit to a woman whose husband was a longstanding community member with a good reputation. It was relatively
ineffective for a destitute member of a mobile, immigrant, or poor
family.
Another option that was available to a wife lacking financial
support was to pursue a legal separation that could require her
husband to provide periodic or one-time payments. 49 This approach included separate maintenance orders entered by a court,
privately negotiated separation agreements, and divorce with alimony.50 Awarded sums often included support for children, explicitly or implicitly.51 Still, much like the doctrine of necessaries,
a separation was most helpful to a certain type of wife: one who

47 Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 66 at 108–10
(cited in note 42).
48 Id at § 72 at 118–19.
49 A husband could be liable for his wife’s attorney’s fees and court costs by court
order or pursuant to the doctrine of necessaries, though practicalities and legal complexities meant recovery was not assured. See Case Note, Divorce—Counsel Fees—Allowance
to Wife—Dean v. Dean, 15 Yale L J 376 (1906); Husband and Wife—Attorney’s Fees—Husband’s Liability—Hendrick v. Silver, 19 Yale L J 55 (1909).
50 Separate maintenance was initially provided under courts’ equity power and was
later supplemented by statutes. Most states allowed wives to obtain maintenance orders,
providing regular payments, by the first decade of the twentieth century. See, for example,
Cureton v Cureton, 96 SW 608 (Tenn 1906); Hagert v Hagert, 133 NW 1035 (ND 1911).
Alternatively, couples could privately execute separation agreements. While the enforceability of such contracts was shaky through the mid-1800s, most courts upheld their validity by the end of the century so long as they seemed fair and were executed when a
couple had already separated or was separating imminently. Schouler, A Treatise on the
Law of Domestic Relations § 215 at 324, § 217 at 328–29 (cited in note 42). States also
passed statutes permitting divorce and alimony upon a finding of fault against one party,
with common permissible bases including adultery, cruelty, and desertion. Id at § 220 at
336–40.
51 Frederic J. Stimson, American Statute Law § 6245 at 698, § 6351 at 710 (Charles
C. Soule 1886). See also generally Support of Children in Absence of Provision Therefor in
Decree Awarding Custody to Divorced Wife, 17 Yale L J 284 (1908) (finding a sharp conflict
in authority regarding the liability of a father for support of his children in the absence of
a decree, but noting “trend of the decisions” in favor of imposing liability).

1256

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:1241

could reasonably expect her husband’s compliance with a privately negotiated agreement or court order because he had assets,
a permanent domicile, and a reputation to maintain.52
If a man refused to comply with a support order, the cost, delay, and legal complexity involved in pursuing enforcement were
often prohibitive—especially if he fled the jurisdiction.53 The wife
would need to find and follow the man, hire a lawyer and pay
court fees, and attempt to persuade a court to hold the man in
contempt of court for refusal to comply with a court order.54 If she
succeeded, the husband (or ex-husband) might decide to comply,
at least for a time, or he might sit idly in jail.55 Once the man was
released, the process might begin again. In some locations, the
wife would have no further recourse. For instance, New York allowed only a one-time, six-month jail term for contempt of an order, and then noncompliance brought no further legal
consequences.56
The third category of law addressing failure to support was
the poor law. Derived from Elizabethan statutes, the poor law traditionally permitted localities to secure fines or payments from
certain relatives of people who were at risk of becoming public
charges. The poor law was originally unhelpful to wives because

52 When men owned assets and especially real property, courts could ensure compliance with support orders through liens, attachment, or security. Stimson, American Statute Law at § 6266 at 704 (cited in note 51). These options became less effective over time,
as more men worked for weekly wages. See John Lisle, The Bases of Divorce, 4 J Crim L
& Criminology 30, 45–46 (1913).
53 William H. Baldwin, Family Desertion and Non-Support Laws 13 (Associated
Charities 1904) (“Even in the few cases where [the man] has some [property that can be
reached by civil suit], the expense and delay of prosecuting the suit in the higher courts
make the remedy practically unavailable.”).
54 For representative examples of matrimonial contempt cases, see Lester v Lester,
63 Ga 357 (1879); Peel v Peel, 50 Iowa 521 (1879); Andrew v Andrew, 20 A 817 (Vt 1890).
55 Alimony nonpayers in New York were infamously housed together in a jail dubbed
the “alimony club.” Why Not a Hotel Suite for the Alimony Club?, Brooklyn Daily Eagle 18
(Jan 22, 1908). Nearly all courts held that such jailings did not violate constitutional provisions against imprisonment for debt, often on the basis that support payments were a
duty rather than a debt. See Case Note, Divorce—Alimony—Refusal to Pay Alimony Punished as Contempt, 30 Harv L Rev 518–19 (1917); Ex parte Davis, 111 SW 394, 396 (Tex
1908) (denying a writ of habeas seeking release from jail following a contempt order for
failure to pay).
56 This rule applied to all civil contempt but was particularly problematic in the alimony context, in which some men decided it was worthwhile to spend six months in jail to
avoid a lifetime of payments. The legislature changed the law in 1919, so orders requiring
repeat payments could result in multiple contempt violations. New Law Has Teeth That
Bite All Joy from Alimony Club, Brooklyn Daily Eagle 66 (Aug 17, 1919).
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many provisions did not apply to spouses and payments reimbursed poorhouses, rather than going directly to dependents. 57
Yet as judges and legislators refined options available to wealthier women, they simultaneously transformed poor law from an
outdated method of securing a pittance for destitute kin to a workable approach to enforcing men’s marital duties.58 Most notably,
the revised poor law allowed a wife to initiate suit and receive
support payments directly. 59 In some respects the revised poor
law was even superior to private civil suits, for eligible candidates
received government employees’ assistance in court proceedings,
rather than needing to hire a lawyer or appearing pro se.60
Like the necessaries doctrine and legal separations, poor law
had a serious flaw exposed by men’s increasing mobility. The
reach of the poor law stopped at each state’s borders. Judges
deemed the poor law “quasi-criminal,” meaning it was penal in
nature but not subject to the trappings of criminal law. 61 Crucially, the quasi-criminal categorization meant poor law charges
did not qualify for extradition.62
B. Charity Leaders and the Need for Extradition
By the late nineteenth century, the inability of existing
family support laws to reach across state lines troubled charity
groups, whose limited resources and aversion to almsgiving made

57 See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law,
43 Cal L Rev 175, 199 (1955) (“The traditional common law had no occasion to concern
itself with the duties of maintenance between husband and wife or parent and child.”).
58 See, for example, Commonwealth v Teel, 30 Pa County Ct 566 (1905) (discussing
evolution in Pennsylvania nonsupport statutes, from poor law to quasi-criminal to
criminal).
59 There is not a clear line separating traditional poor law from what I am calling
“the revised poor law.” States continually modified their poor law from the colonial period
through at least the early twentieth century. In this Article, “revised poor law” refers to
penal but not fully criminal statutes that allowed dependents to initiate proceedings
against men to obtain court orders for regular payments.
60 For a step-by-step account of how this legal machinery worked in New York City,
see The Number of New-York Men Who Pay Alimony Has Increased Since the City Began
to Collect It, NY Trib Illustrated Supp 5 (Apr 12, 1903).
61 Duffy v People, 6 Hill 75 (NY 1843); State v Miller, 52 A 262 (Del 1902). But see
Schweitzer, 18 A at 787 (finding statute penalizing nonsupport of wife a criminal rather
than civil prosecution).
62 Technically, delivery of fugitives between US states is “rendition,” but this Article
uses “extradition” to reflect the more common usage in the primary sources. On the inaccuracy in terminology, see John Bassett Moore, Treatise on Extradition and Interstate
Rendition, Part II § 516 at 819–20 (1891).
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charitable support of deserted wives unpalatable.63 Even after a
severe economic depression in 1893, charity organizations were
reticent to provide support to needy families. The middle-class,
white professionals who populated these groups’ memberships64
feared that providing alms would incentivize men to desert or provide an opportunity for collusion, in which “the desertion was
purely fictitious, and designed to extort money from the charitably inclined.”65 At the same time, finding a source of family funding seemed vital because charity leaders no longer perceived institutionalizing young children apart from their mothers as
acceptable.66 Together these concerns raised the importance of securing financial support directly from male providers just as doing so became more challenging.67
Charity leaders recognized that industrialization, immigration, urbanization, and improved transportation contributed to
heightened mobility and anonymity that shielded men from social
and legal enforcement of their financial obligations.68 In 1900, one
captured a growing consensus when he described family desertion
as “an evil of increasing magnitude and menace,” which imposed
heavy burdens on public and private charitable resources.69 What
was needed, reformers thought, was federal legislation or, perhaps more achievable, a felony-level offense to qualify for extradition.70 A turn to criminal law also offered greater deterrence,
appropriate moral condemnation of deserters, and the possibility
of attractive new enforcement methods.71

63 This aversion was born from developments in the 1870s. Michael B. Katz, In the
Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 58, 68–75, 85 (Basic
Books 1986); Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 91–96 (Free Press 6th ed 1999).
64 Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse at 79 (cited in note 63).
65 Family Deserters: All Day Conference at Charities Building—Remedies Suggested,
NY Daily Trib 7 (Apr 30, 1903). See also Ada Eliot, Deserted Wives, 10 Charities Rev 346,
347–48 (1900) (discussing risk of spousal collusion).
66 Edward T. Devine, The Breaking Up of Families, 10 Charities Rev 461, 461–62
(1900) (original source incorrectly labels page 462 as page 362). For more context, see
David S. Tanenhaus, Growing Up Dependent: Family Preservation in Early TwentiethCentury Chicago, 19 Law & Hist Rev 547, 549–50 (2001) (discussing a historical trend
away from institutionalization and toward family unit preservation).
67 See, for example, Mary Richmond, Proper Treatment of Idle or Drinking Men and
Their Neglected Families: “Married Vagabonds”, 4 Charities Rev 401, 401–02 (1895).
68 Baldwin, Family Desertion at 5–9 (cited in note 53).
69 Devine, 10 Charities Rev at 464 (cited in note 66).
70 Id at 465.
71 Id at 464–65; Eliot, 10 Charities Rev at 348 (cited in note 65).
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While making nonsupport extraditable was uncontroversial
among charity reformers, the choice between a felony and a misdemeanor spurred debate.72 For instance, charity leaders at an
all-day conference on the subject of “Family Desertions” in 1903
began by reading “extracts from [an] exhaustive memorandum”
on the application of extradition law. 73 The ensuing discussion
prompted the National Conference of Charities and Correction to
issue resolutions that condemned desertion as a “serious evil,”
identified extradition as “the most effective remedy and deterrent,” and implored governors to cooperate in submitting and honoring rendition requests.74 Many charity leaders concluded that a
felony law best guaranteed that extradition would occur. 75 By
1904, four states had felony-level offenses in place.76
But reformers also realized that felony-level criminalization
brought practical, political, and legal challenges. Practical concerns included that a felony might motivate men to desert further
away to reduce the likelihood of being caught, impose a harmful
stigma on convicts, expose men to corrupting influences in prison,

72 See, for example, Broken Hearted Woman, Buffalo Evening News 17 (June 21,
1895); Needy Families in Their Homes, 9 Charities 17, 18 (1902).
73 Conference on Family Desertions: Law to Make Desertion of Wife and Children a
Felony Is Advocated in New York, 10 Charities 483 (1903). Extradition law in the surrounding period was in a state of confusion. In an effort to agree on general principles and
procedures, most states sent representatives to the Inter-State Extradition Conference of
1887. During the Conference, participants sought to increase uniformity and reciprocity
without requiring extradition of “petty” offenses (even though the Extradition Clause of
the Constitution makes no such distinction, as they acknowledged). Though the participants did not discuss nonsupport specifically, they described the somewhat related offense
of bastardy as falling in the “petty” category. This discussion likely contributed to the perception that misdemeanor nonsupport might not qualify for extradition. Proceedings of the
Inter-State Extradition Conference, Held at the Rooms of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, August 23d, 24th and 25th 1887 24–29, 66–69, 87, 95 (Argus 1887). See
also Fred Somkin, The Strange Career of Fugitivity in the History of Interstate Extradition,
1984 Utah L Rev 511, 517–18.
74 Family Desertion Resolutions, 10 Charities 488 (1903).
75 See, for example, Helen Foss, The Genus Deserter: His Singularities and Their
Social Consequences—A Study of Local Fact and Interstate Remedies, 10 Charities 456,
458–60 (1903).
76 Baldwin, Family Desertion at 15 (cited in note 53). At least two states made nonsupport of wives a misdemeanor in the 1860s, a development that historians have overlooked, but this was a minority approach until the period discussed in this Article. For
evidence of these statutes, see Missouri v Larger, 45 Mo 510 (1870); An Act to Protect Married Women from the Willful Abandonment or Neglect of Their Husbands, Tarborough
Southerner (North Carolina) § 2 (May 20, 1869). Some states passed criminal child abandonment laws in the 1870s, but these typically applied to extreme circumstances and were
not used to obtain support payments. For example, Cowley v People, 8 Abb N Cas 1 (NY
1880) (discussing an 1876 statute).
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and perhaps lessen authorities’ willingness to enforce the law because of a perception it was too harsh.77 Recognition that a felony
law might be more difficult to pass led some legislators to pursue
a misdemeanor instead.78
Felony doubters found their champion in William H.
Baldwin, a member of the Board of Managers of the Associated
Charities of Washington, DC. In 1904, Baldwin published an influential overview of existing nonsupport laws and a model statute to secure extradition and effective enforcement. 79 Baldwin
marshalled evidence—from constitutional analysis, case law, and
correspondence with state attorneys general—to prove that misdemeanor nonsupport would qualify for and actually receive extradition. 80 Building on existing critiques of felonies, Baldwin
added that juries might be less likely to convict on felony offenses
and that nonsupport cases should be heard in the “court of lowest
rank” (which would not be permissible for a felony offense) to
avoid delays and court fees. 81 Baldwin’s proposed uniform law
was therefore a misdemeanor.82
Baldwin spoke and published widely, persuading many charity workers and legislators across the country that the misdemeanor approach permitted extradition and was preferable for
strategic reasons.83 His vision gained further prominence in 1906,
when Congress passed a misdemeanor nonsupport law for the
District of Columbia based directly on his proposal.84 Baldwin’s
model and its successes in DC, in turn, were credited as the inspiration for the Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act (“Uniform
Act”) promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1910. The Uniform Act led to passage of additional criminal
laws, mostly at the misdemeanor level.85
77 Should Wife Desertion Be Made a Felony, Punishable by Imprisonment?, Boston Post
27 (Nov 15, 1903). See also Extradition of Deserting Husbands, 14 Charities 773, 774 (1905).
78 Make Wife Desertion Criminal, Pittston Gazette 4 (Feb 11, 1903); Many Wives Are
Deserted Annually in Pennsylvania, Wilkes-Barre Times Leader 4 (Feb 12, 1903).
79 See generally Baldwin, Family Desertion (cited in note 53).
80 Id at 30–46.
81 Id at 15–16, 19, 47, 53.
82 Id (“A Uniform Law Relative to Family Desertion and Non-Support” in unnumbered appendix).
83 See, for example, William H. Baldwin, An Extraditable Offense: Not Necessary for
Desertion to Be a Felony to Bring Back Fugitive, Wash Post 9 (July 17, 1905); William H.
Baldwin, Family Desertion and Non-Support Laws, 14 Charities 660 (1905).
84 See Wife Deserters’ Fate: Must Support Families or Go to the Workhouse, Wash
Post 3 (Apr 18, 1906).
85 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform
Desertion Act 3 n 1 (Railway Printing 1910) (describing influence of Baldwin and DC law);
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Importantly, reformers, legislators, and lawyers supported
the passage and use of criminal nonsupport laws, even though
they knew that the preexisting civil options remained available.86
Advocates of criminalization explained that the criminal law
avoided many of the civil laws’ obstacles. In civil cases the wife
had to hire a lawyer, pay court fees, clear fault-related evidentiary hurdles, and obtain an initial order for separate maintenance or alimony. These steps all too often culminated in the negligent provider’s refusal to comply. The wife then had to pursue
another hearing to ask a judge to incarcerate the man for contempt. This outcome provided no financial relief to his dependents.87 Criminal procedure was more streamlined and cheaper for
the wife. Contempt seemed worthwhile only in minor, limited contexts. The Uniform Act, for instance, authorized the use of contempt to enforce an order pendente lite (requiring a criminal defendant to support his family until the conclusion of the criminal
proceeding).88 In the words of one state supreme court in 1914, its
legislature’s decision to pass a criminal nonsupport statute created “a sharper and more effective spear.”89
By the early 1910s, legislators in nearly every state had criminalized nonsupport. 90 Though misdemeanor statutes were the
most popular, many states simultaneously maintained quasicriminal and felony laws.91 The existence of several nonsupport
statutes was designed to permit prosecutorial discretion and a
range of procedural options. For example, when Pennsylvania legislators debated passing a misdemeanor, they explained courts
could still use the preexisting quasi-criminal procedure “in all ordinary cases . . . , which would have the advantage of greater

Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the Fifty-Fourth Annual Conference Meeting 283 (Lord Baltimore 1944) (listing
dates states adopted Uniform Act).
86 See notes 53–56.
87 See, for example, Baldwin, Family Desertion at 13 (cited in note 53).
88 Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform Desertion Act at 6–7,
9 (cited in note 85).
89 State v Yocum, 106 NE 705, 705–06 (Ind 1914). See also State v Francis, 269 P
878, 880 (Or 1928) (“[T]he penalty for a contempt is not as severe as for the crime of failure
to support; the latter is an extraditable crime.”); State v McMains, 241 P2d 976, 979 (Okla
App 1952) (recounting why civil remedies had proven inadequate against husbands “without estate or honor”).
90 By 1916, every state had criminalized either nonsupport or desertion. Willrich,
City of Courts at 147 (cited in note 16).
91 William H. Baldwin, The Present Status of Family Desertion and Non-Support
Laws 1–3 (2d ed 1912).
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speed, since it requires no jury.”92 In practice prosecutors took this
strategy one step further. They extradited using the misdemeanor law, dropped the charges, and proceeded under the quasicriminal statute.93
In states that also included a felony law, prosecutors rarely
opted to use it because it brought cumbersome legal machinery,
lack of cooperation by wives, and other hurdles.94 For instance, in
New York, felony cases comprised less than 2 percent of the nonsupport suits in 1909 and 1910. 95 Still, having the felony law
available seemed beneficial to reformers. Reflecting on the portfolio of legal options maintained by many states, Baldwin “recall[ed] the story of the man who replied to the inquiry of the undertaker, after the death of his mother-in-law, as to whether he
should embalm, cremate or bury: ‘Embalm, cremate and bury;
take no chances.’” 96
With criminal nonsupport laws in place, extradition became
a reality. From 1906 through 1910, 20 states pursued extradition
of nonsupport offenders, totaling 837 requests.97 In some states
nonsupport comprised a significant portion of overall extradition
proceedings. In Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and
Wisconsin, between 15 and 30 percent of extradition requests
were for nonsupport.98 Proponents of nonsupport criminalization
therefore perceived that these laws brought real benefits.
C. The Application of Probation to Nonsupport Cases
A near consensus that nonsupport could and should be criminalized did not answer what punishment should be attached.
Charity workers, legislators, and other stakeholders sought a consequence that would maximize deterrence, preserve the family (at
92 Many Wives Are Deserted Annually in Pennsylvania, Wilkes-Barre Times Leader
at 4 (cited in note 78). For an unsuccessful challenge to the denial of jury rights in such
cases, see Commonwealth v Nagle, 31 Pa Super Ct 175 (1906).
93 See generally William H. Baldwin, Is It Lawful to Bring a Man Back to
Pennsylvania by Extradition on the Charge of Desertion under the Act of March 13, 1903,
for the Purpose of Proceeding against Him under the Act of April 13, 1867?, 4 J Crim L &
Criminology 20 (1913). Pennsylvania apparently still used this trick as of 1922. Commonwealth v Kenney, 80 Pa Super 418, 419 (1923).
94 See, for example, 1,800 Deserted Wives, 22 Survey 838 (1909) (noting that a NY
charity group found that the district attorney’s office disinclined to prosecute desertion
cases after the offense was made a felony).
95 Baldwin, The Present Status at 7 (cited in note 91).
96 Id at 8.
97 Id at 19.
98 Id.
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least in a financial sense), and lighten the burden on charities and
the state to support women and children.
Beginning in the 1890s, many charity workers expressed optimism about the usefulness of imprisonment at hard labor for its
deterrent value and financial savings. Baldwin was a prominent
proponent, further suggesting that a system under which a man’s
prison labor supported his dependents would safeguard “the unity
of the family . . . in spite of the intervening prison walls.”99 But
charity workers from other states were less optimistic that this
would be feasible because their jurisdictions did not have workhouses or prison farms, or reserved these options for those imprisoned for at least a year. Other locales lacked legal authority to
give proceeds to prisoners’ dependents. 100 Furthermore, as the
first decade of the twentieth century progressed, opposition to
prison labor made this option less promising.101
Just as imprisonment at hard labor began losing its appeal,
a new penal method rose to the fore: conditional release on probation.102 Probation built on a range of legal and social forerunners, such as suspended sentence and “friendly visiting.”103 The
supervisory and suspended sentence components came together
in Boston beginning in 1841, and first became formalized in a series of Massachusetts bills beginning in 1869.104 In the late nineteenth century, Boston’s model attracted nationwide attention,
touted as “an essential part of the criminal mechanism.”105 From

99

Baldwin, Family Desertion at 56–57 (cited in note 53).
See, for example, Richmond, 4 Charities Rev at 413–16 (cited in note 67); Wife
Desertion, 15 Charities 407 (1905) (explaining that imprisonment would not support dependents, especially after changes to the “prison industry” left prisoners idle).
101 The Uniform Act drafters noted that some states had abolished or limited prison
labor “as the result of the influence of the Labor Unions.” Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, American Uniform Desertion Act at 5–6 (cited in note 85). See also Rebecca M.
McLennan, The Crisis of Imprisonment: Protest, Politics, and the Making of the American
Penal State, 1776–1941 193–238 (Cambridge 2008).
102 Compare Jonathan Simon, Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control of the
Underclass, 1890–1990 35–37 (Chicago 1993) (discussing connection between restrictions
on prison labor and rise of parole).
103 For discussion of “friendly visiting,” see Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse at
159–66 (cited in note 63).
104 Charles Lionel Chute and Marjorie Bell, Crime, Courts, and Probation 31–66
(MacMillan 1956). Depending on how “probation” is defined, it can be dated to earlier periods. For an excellent treatment of a nineteenth-century version, see generally George
Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 Yale L J 857 (2000).
105 “Probation” in Boston: A System Tried in the Courts of that City with Success, NY
Daily Trib 3 (Mar 27, 1899).
100
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1898 through 1903, ten states across the country passed their
first probation laws. More soon followed.106
Probation, which typically included both preconviction investigation and postconviction supervision by court staff titled “probation officers,” quickly appeared to offer many advantages over
imprisonment. In New York, which first authorized probation in
1901, the New York City magistrates identified four benefits:
(1) “Punishment without disgrace, and effective without producing embitterment, resentment or demoralization,” (2) judicial discretion to make the punishment fit the crime, (3) “[p]unishment
that is borne solely by the guilty and displacing a system that
frequently involved the innocent and helpless,” and (4) punishment “attended by increased revenue to the City and by a saving
in expense.”107
These strengths seemed even more advantageous in the nonsupport context. In these cases, a probation officer could first attempt to reconcile the couple outside of formal court proceedings.
(Many spouses lived together or had a history of separating and
coming back together, making reconciliation seem plausible.) The
officer’s intervention often included guidance on behaviors technically outside the court’s jurisdiction. For instance, a probation
officer might encourage a husband to drink less alcohol and instruct a wife on housekeeping skills. If that failed, the officer investigated the husband’s income and the family’s home conditions, provided this information to the judge, and oversaw the
transfer of support payments. Under this method, the male
breadwinner would remain out of prison, pursuing an ordinary
occupation, yet be forced to turn over money to his dependents.108
Many nonsupport statutes also permitted a defendant to “consent” to probation with weekly support payments prior to
conviction.109
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Chute and Bell, Crime, Courts, and Probation at 73, 84 (cited in note 104).
Annual Report of the Board of City Magistrates of the City of New York (First Division) for the Year Ending December 31, 1901 15–16 (JW Pratt 1902).
108 For descriptions of probation officer tasks in these cases, see “Probation” in Boston,
NY Daily Trib (cited in note 105); Aid Deserted Wives: New Laws Are Urged in Book by
W.H. Baldwin, Wash Post 10 (Jan 21, 1912); Six Hundred Men Are on Probation, Buffalo
Evening News 5 (Oct 31, 1910); Restoring Peace to Broken St. Louis Homes, St Louis PostDispatch B4 (Feb 20, 1916); Leon Stern and Elizabeth Stern, Domestic Relations at Par:
How Philadelphia Tries to Make Every Marriage Worth Its Face Value to Both Society and
the Couple Involved, 72 Good Housekeeping 65 (1921).
109 Baldwin, Family Desertion at 71, 79, 124, 135 (cited in note 53); Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform Desertion Act at 7 (cited in note 85).
107
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Court statistics document that judges increasingly relied on
probation in nonsupport cases. In New York City, the second most
common reason men were placed on probation in 1902 was a nonsupport conviction.110 States soon amended their laws to explicitly
provide for probation in this context. 111 In some places legislatures originally authorized adult probation exclusively or primarily for nonsupport offenders.112
Criminal nonsupport cases became the poster crime for adult
probation because the financial and moral benefits seemed obvious. Men convicted of nonsupport were not perceived as dangerous. Rather, their conduct violated middle-class, gendered norms
in ways that lawmakers and law implementers believed probation officers could fix. 113 In a representative newspaper article
from 1903, the author praised “the recent general adoption of probation methods by a number of the more important cities and
states,” yet the only specific offense he discussed was nonsupport. 114 In nonsupport cases, probation meant “the husband is
sent back to his home and employment under supervision, and,
consequently, neither is he kept a burden on the state in prison
or are his wife and children thrown upon the public or private
charity through the loss of the head of the family.”115 In addition
to financial savings, the article continued, probation supervision
was imposed “with the hope of possibly restoring [the man] to a
worthy and self-respecting citizenship.”116
Probation proponents strategically emphasized the collection
of support payments as tangible evidence of probation’s value.
110 Annual Report of the Board of City Magistrates of the City of New York (First Division) for the Year Ending December 31, 1902 10–11 (JW Pratt 1903).
111 New York amended its statute in 1903 to explicitly apply to nonsupport, and New
Jersey passed a law titled “Deserting Husbands Placed on Probation” in 1905. Report of
the Probation Commission of the State of New York 232, 240 (Brandow 1906).
112 Probation Manual with Analysis of the Probation Laws of Virginia 4 (St Bd Charities and Correction 1918) (noting that when Virginia authorized probation in 1904, it was
“to be used chiefly in case of adults who failed to support their children”).
113 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were parallel efforts by
affluent women and government officials to enforce gendered expectations on poor women
through control over private and public charity. There is a rich literature on this topic. See
Willrich, 87 J Am Hist at 462 n 4 (cited in note 16) (listing major contributions). On an
earlier period, see generally Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York,
1789–1860 (Knopf 1986).
114 William H. Allen, The Probation System, Its Great Advantages, Atlanta Const C4
(July 5, 1903).
115 Id.
116 Id. For examples of similar arguments in the following decades, see Husbands on
Probation, San Bernardino County Sun 4 (Aug 20, 1913); Edwin J. Cooley, Mending Broken Families, 4 Woman’s Home Companion 4, 152–56 (1925).
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The Massachusetts Commission on Probation’s Fifth Annual Report pointed out an expansion from 617 nonsupporting husbands
providing $25,218.13 on probation in 1909 to 1,240 nonsupporting
husbands submitting $140,773.96 in 1913. 117 A Massachusetts
probation officer who coauthored a book promoting the method
reported that officers in his state collected $219,984 for wives and
children in 1915, whereas the whole probation system cost only
$148,000. 118 Similarly, a 1918 Virginia probation manual concluded that probation was “highly economical. Keep a man at
work; require him to support his family, and you save the public
from supporting the entire family.”119
Probation officials also stressed the affordability of probation
as compared to imprisonment. In a nearly full-page discussion of
probation printed in the New York Tribune in 1920, New York
City’s Chief Probation Officer, Edwin J. Cooley, noted: “It costs
$396.56 a year per capita for prison care in New York and only
$22.64 for probation care.” Moreover, Cooley continued, “Men on
probation support themselves and their families and they are productive factors in the community,” rather than their families becoming “a burden upon the public.” 120 Economic arguments became more compelling in the heat of perceived crime waves.
Advocates emphasized the sizable proportion of uncontroversial
and lucrative nonsupport cases to deflect criticism from probation’s alleged role in keeping dangerous criminals on the
streets.121
Unsurprisingly, the men most likely to receive probation sentences were poor and often from immigrant or minority groups,
although the populations varied by location. In New York City,
probation proponents initially focused on European immigrants,122 whereas in Southern cities, black-white racial dynamics
were more prominent.123 Although certain groups were more often

117

Proposes Women Probation Officers, Boston Daily Globe 6 (Jan 28, 1914).
Lewis E. MacBrayne and James P. Ramsay, One More Chance: An Experiment in
Human Salvage 167 (Small, Maynard 1916).
119 Probation Manual at 3 (cited in note 112).
120 Getting Back to the Straight and Narrow Path; One Slip No Longer Makes a Confirmed Criminal, NY Trib 79 (Oct 17, 1920).
121 Defense of Probation, NY Times 85 (Aug 6, 1922). See also generally NY Division
of Probation—Department of Correction, Probation: Do You Know That (1928).
122 Probation to Be Extended to Higher Criminal Courts, NY Times X15 (Feb 8, 1925)
(discussing earlier probation work).
123 For example, Praise: By Judge Wilson for Colored Probation Officers, CourierJournal (Louisville, Ky) 10 (Dec 10, 1906).
118
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placed on probation for nonsupport, in large part because of a correlation between nationality or race and poverty, probation rhetoric and justifications turned on the nature of the offense rather
than pointing to categories of men warranting supervision. 124
Nevertheless, that men from some groups were more often subject
to probation oversight may have eased the method’s acceptance.
And, over time, probation treatment of these men may have
shaped stereotypes about them.
The intervention of probation officers in the behaviors and
finances of married couples marked a major change in the state’s
involvement in family affairs. No government officials were allocated to reconcile couples or assist dependents in pursuing financial support under the guise of necessaries cases or in the context
of separation agreements, separate maintenance, or divorce with
alimony—all of which remained options even as criminal law
spread.125 Officials did facilitate the filing and processing of poor
law cases, but in those matters they did not seek to reconcile couples or surveil compliance and other family behaviors. Criminalization accompanied by probation opened distinctly new opportunities for state regulation of family life.

124 This assessment is based on the author’s review of hundreds of newspaper articles
and other primary sources.
125 There were some efforts to introduce probation-like techniques in divorce suits,
but these met with limited success and did not include oversight of support payments.
Legislatures in a handful of Midwestern and Western states authorized the appointment
of “divorce proctors” in the 1910s and 1920s. Divorce proctors were tasked with ensuring
legitimate divorce grounds and attempting to reconcile couples. Their role was justified by
the state’s interest in preserving marriage. Unlike probation officers, divorce proctors usually had to be lawyers, and they did not oversee compliance with support orders. Based on
newspaper accounts, the locations that used divorce proctors most extensively seem to
have been Kansas City, Missouri; the state of Kansas; large cities and counties in
Tennessee; and Seattle, Washington. For representative articles, see Proctor as Curb on
Divorce Evil for Kansas City, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 8 (Nov 8, 1911); Divorce Proctor to
Guard State, Chi Daily Trib I20 (Feb 23, 1913) (reporting on Kansas State). Nationwide
press coverage of the first divorce proctors prompted proposals to introduce such officers
elsewhere, but the vast majority of states never adopted this method of marital intervention. For example, Divorce Proctor Urged; Would Cut Decrees in Half, Chi Daily Trib 1
(Jan 6, 1912); William Hall Moreland, Five Divorce Remedies, NY Times 1, 80 (June 5,
1921). Secondary literature also notes similar positions under other names in Arkansas,
Nebraska, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Charles S. Connolly, Divorce Proctors, 34 BU L
Rev 1, 1 (1954). In later decades, states tried other methods of predivorce reconciliation.
One of the more notable examples was the Los Angeles Conciliation Court, which handled
divorce-seeking couples who had children in the years after WWII. DiFonzo, Beneath the
Fault Line at 129 (cited in note 16).
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D. Legal Challenges to Criminal Nonsupport Enforcement
Though widely praised by charity leaders, lawmakers, and
journalists, criminal nonsupport laws faced some opposition focused on their blurring of criminal and civil goals, remedies, and
procedures. For instance, one New York City magistrate condemned how in nonsupport cases the court “enforce[d] a civil obligation by criminal procedure, although imprisonment for debt
was long ago abolished in every enlightened community.” 126 A
New York organization focused on addressing family nonsupport
objected to proposals to elevate wife abandonment to a felony because it did not want to allow a scenario in which a wife could
initiate a criminal case to extradite her husband “at public expense” to facilitate a civil proceeding, and then use the criminal
charge to enhance her bargaining power. While ostensibly satisfying the organization’s main goal, the civil-criminal slipperiness
of this scheme struck the group as objectionable “because it gives
the wife the indirect power of using the criminal law for private
ends.”127
Once criminal nonsupport laws were in place, defendants
sometimes lodged legal objections. Appeals were relatively infrequent because most convicts lacked resources. Nevertheless, dozens of cases demonstrate that some men had both the means and
desire to contest the application or constitutionality of criminal
nonsupport statutes. Nearly all of these challenges failed.128
One question defendants raised for decades was whether
criminal nonsupport encompassed only the public offense of leaving a dependent likely to become a public charge or also reached
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Joseph E. Corrigan, Corrigan Speaks Out, NY Daily Trib 7 (Apr 23, 1910).
National Desertion Bureau, Memoranda in Opposition to Proposed Amendment to
the Penal Law and Code of Criminal Procedure in Relation to Desertion and Non-Support
and to Repeal Certain Sections in Such Law and Code Relating Thereto, Known as Senate
Bill No. 773 *3–4 (March 15, 1916), Community Service Society Archives, Box 18, Folder
15.23, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.
128 For examples of courts rejecting challenges to criminal nonsupport laws, see People v Heise, 100 NE 1000 (Ill 1913); Martin v People, 168 P 1171 (Colo 1917). The most
noteworthy case striking down a criminal nonsupport statute was Ex parte Smythe, in
which the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held its entire nonsupport law unconstitutional, despite its “beneficent” purpose. The court found that a provision directing that the
defendant’s fine be given to his wife or child violated the state constitution’s ban on “appropriation for private or individual purposes.” The man’s “moral and civil liability to support the wife and child” could not justify circumventing this prohibition. Ex parte Smythe,
120 SW 200, 201 (Tex Crim App 1909).
127
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what had been a private duty for a man to support his family according to his means, in line with the doctrine of necessaries.129
Charity reformer proposals and resultant statutory language often left unclear what level of destitution was required for the law
to apply, as well as whether a guilty verdict required nonsupport,
desertion, or the combined existence of both. (The Uniform Act
covered those who “desert or willfully neglect or refuse to provide”
for wives or children “in destitute or necessitous circumstances.”130) While some appellate judges construed nonsupport
statutes to cover just the public charge scenario on the basis that
criminal law could only address public harms, 131 others recognized legislatures’ power to pass criminal legislation to address
conduct that carried private and public implications.132
Over time, most states’ courts embraced a blended publicprivate purpose for their criminal nonsupport laws. An influential
decision published by the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1911 exemplifies this approach. In construing a criminal statute that applied only when a family was in “destitute or necessitous circumstances,” the court pointed to the doctrine of necessaries in

129 See, for example, People v Stickle, 121 NW 497, 499 (Mich 1909) (construing statutory revision that removed public charge requirement).
130 Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform Desertion Act at 3 (emphasis added) (cited in note 85). Some courts got around this uncertainty with broad statutory construction. See, for example, Welch v State, 67 So 224, 225 (Fla 1915) (holding that
nonsupport itself constituted “desertion”).
131 Especially where nonsupport laws evolved directly from poor law, judges interpreted them to apply only when dependents were likely to become public charges. An influential early opinion finding a narrow purpose for a quasi-criminal statute is Douglas v
Naehr, 30 Hun 461, 463 (NY Gen Term 1883) (“The statute was designed to protect the
public against the burden of supporting a wife and children . . . It was not intended to give
the wife any new remedy either directly or indirectly.”). In jurisdictions with such holdings, wives were expected to seek relief under civil statutes. Demos v Demos, 19 NY Ann
Cas 171, 100 NY Supp 968 (NY App 1906) (directing wife to pursue separation in civil
court rather than criminal nonsupport suit). A 1925 analysis found that judges in states
that passed quasi-criminal (revised poor law) or criminal statutes relatively early limited
application to public charge situations, but those in states with later statutes interpreted
them more generously. W.A.S., Annotation, Extent or Character of Support Contemplated
by Statute Making Nonsupport of Wife or Child Offense, 36 ALR 866 (1925).
132 For early examples of state supreme courts upholding criminal nonsupport laws,
see State v Cucullu, 35 S 300, 302 (La 1903); Green v State, 131 SW 463 (Ark 1910). In
Cucullu, the Supreme Court of Louisiana dismissed a man’s claim that a misdemeanor
could not properly address duties that were “essentially matters of a civil character.” The
court explained: “The performance by a husband and father of the legal duties which he
voluntarily assumed in contracting marriage is a matter which not only affects the particular parties in interest, but the public at large, as affecting the general public welfare.”
Cucullu, 35 S at 302.
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holding that the legislature did not intend to limit the required
support to “primitive physical needs.” The court explained:
The law is not a mere poor law. It is a domestic duty law, and
was intended to cover the case of a woman who is left destitute according to any just and humane estimate of her situation, although in the eyes of paupers she might appear to be
rich.133
Acknowledging that some penal statutes “contemplated nothing
but redress of the public grievance” of family members becoming
public charges, the court observed that others “were designed to
aid civil remedies.” 134 In the surrounding decades, most judges
and other interested commenters likewise embraced the use of
criminal law to enforce public-private family duties.135
II. THE SYMBIOTIC GROWTH OF FAMILY COURTS AND PROBATION
(1910–1930S)
This Part investigates how reformers created probationbacked “courts of domestic relations” to pursue robust enforcement of criminal nonsupport laws. Cities first opened domestic
relations courts in 1910, as part of a broader Progressive Era
movement for court reform. Probation officers were among the
most vocal supporters and essential employees of these new tribunals. The National Probation Association (NPA), which included domestic relations judges and probation officers in its
ranks, led the effort to spread the domestic relations court idea to
new locations. From the late 1910s into the 1930s, the NPA and
other probation proponents sought to expand the courts’ jurisdiction into “family courts,” which would encompass juvenile delinquency and divorce hearings. They were less successful in that
effort; nonsupport remained the essential core of family-focused
courts.

133 State v Waller, 136 P 215, 216–17 (Kan 1913). See also Brandel v State, 154 NW
997 (Wis 1915) (expanding on Waller). But see Stedman v State, 86 S 428, 431 (Fla 1920)
(retaining public charge requirement).
134 Waller, 125 P at 217.
135 Ewell v State, 114 A2d 66, 69 (Md 1955) (explaining that judges commonly “carried
over” the standards from the necessaries doctrine when construing “destitute” in criminal
nonsupport statutes).
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A. The Creation of Domestic Relations Courts
As reformers refined the application of criminal nonsupport
laws through the use of probation, they also considered the operation of the courts that had jurisdiction over these cases. They
found these criminal courts, as well as the overall court system in
many urban locations, lacking in a number of respects. Criminal
courts were overcrowded, experienced long delays, offered rushed
and unfair hearings, and were sometimes corrupt. 136 Because
these courts were one of the primary places the working class and
newly arrived immigrants interacted with the American legal
system, many judges, politicians, and social welfare leaders
thought court reform would aid in inculcating respect for law and
Americanizing litigants.137
One major facet of early twentieth-century court reform was
the specialization of courts. While subsets of courts had long focused on particular subjects, 138 Progressive Era reformers
thought further specialization would secure efficiency and expertise.139 Perhaps most famously, in 1899 they inaugurated a movement for juvenile courts to hear children’s delinquency and dependency cases.140 The juvenile court concept spread quickly, so
that by 1917, all but three states introduced these courts for at
least some of their cities.141
The push for specialization extended to marital litigation,
with New York taking the lead. It was not obvious to

136 See, for example, Franklin Matthews, The Farce of Police Court Justice in New
York, 17 New Broadway Mag 511 (1907).
137 “Police Court and the Public”: This Subject Discussed before the People’s Institute,
NY Daily Trib 4 (Dec 29, 1900).
138 For histories of specialized courts in New York beginning in the seventeenth
century, see Past State Courts (Historical Society of the New York Courts), archived at
http://perma.cc/XU4F-BK68.
139 Willrich, City of Courts at xxxii–xxxix (cited in note 16).
140 While Chicago is typically credited as opening the first juvenile court in 1899, cities
experimented with treating juvenile delinquents differently and apart from adult criminals in
earlier decades. There is an extensive literature on juvenile courts. For a helpful historiography,
see generally Miroslava Chavez-Garcia, Book Review, In Retrospect: Anthony M. Platt’s The
Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency, 35 Rev Am Hist 464 (2007).
141 Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency 10 (Chicago 2d
ed 1977). Another example of specialized courts from this period is “women’s courts,”
which primarily handled prostitution cases. For excellent treatments, see Amy J. Cohen,
Trauma and the Welfare State: A Genealogy of Prostitution Courts in New York City, 95
Tex L Rev 915, 933–36 (2017); Mae C. Quinn, Revisiting Anna Moscowitz Kross’s Critique
of New York City’s Women’s Court: The Continued Problem of Solving the “Problem” of
Prostitution with Specialized Criminal Courts, 33 Fordham Urb L J 665, 669–76 (2006).
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New Yorkers, however, which categories of cases warranted separate, special treatment.142 In 1902, lawyers in that state pushed
for a “Domestic Relations Court” to hear divorce cases.143 This effort stalled for political and legal reasons.144
Starting around 1905, attention turned to creating specialized “abandonment courts” to tackle the rising number of
nonsupport cases. Proponents of this idea, mostly charity leaders,
hoped that more systematic treatment of nonsupport offenses by
probation officers in specialized courts would secure support, relieve the burden on general criminal courts, keep innocent wives
and children from mingling with criminals while awaiting their
proceedings, and reconcile families to reduce the divorce rate.145
Though judges shared charity leaders’ enthusiasm about the
use of probation officers in nonsupport cases, they argued that a
specialized court was unnecessary and unappealing.146 Judges did
not want to preside over what they expected would be a tiresome
and monotonous docket. The chief magistrate, in a line widely
quoted by newspapers, suggested that a judge assigned to the envisioned nonsupport court “will have to be descended straight
from the angels.”147
Despite some judges’ aversion, the New York legislature
designated a branch of New York City’s criminal courts as the
country’s first “court of domestic relations” in 1910.148 The court’s

142 In 1894, New York judges unsuccessfully proposed a Court of Domestic Relations
with “jurisdiction of all wills, estates, the relations of guardian and ward, the care of lunatics, and divorces.” Untitled Article (beginning with “Several of the jurists . . .”), NY
Daily Trib 6 (Apr 30, 1894).
143 For a Special Divorce Court, Baltimore Sun 1 (July 8, 1902).
144 Divorce Cases Clog Courts, Atlanta Const A7 (Jan 16, 1910).
145 Alfred E. Ommen, Criminal Courts in General: Some Observations by a City Magistrate, 43 J Soc Sci 38, 40–42 (1905); An Abandonment Court May Be Created Here,
Brooklyn Daily Eagle 18 (May 30, 1907); A Matrimonial Court to End Domestic Wars, NY
Times 6 (Jan 12, 1906).
146 The specialized court proposal received thorough attention during hearings on reforming New York City’s inferior criminal court system in 1908 and 1909. New York, 1
Proceedings of the Commission to Inquire into the Courts of Inferior Criminal Jurisdiction
in Cities of the First Class (JB Lyon 1909). For judges’ commentary, see id at 396, 484,
605–06, 639, 649, 672, 724, 744. See also New York, 2 Proceedings of the Commission to
Inquire into the Courts of Inferior Criminal Jurisdiction in the Cities of the First Class
1408 (JB Lyon 1909).
147 New York, 3 Proceedings of the Commission to Inquire into the Courts of Inferior
Criminal Jurisdiction in the Cities of the First Class 2411–12 (JB Lyon 1909); Want Special Court for Domestic Woes, NY Times 4 (Jan 29, 1909).
148 For Court Reform: Commission to Recommend Abandonment of Tribunal, NY
Daily Trib 5 (Dec 21, 1909). For more detail, including attention to involvement by religious groups, see Igra, Wives without Husbands at 38–44 (cited in note 16).
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sole jurisdiction was over quasi-criminal nonsupport, and it relied
heavily on probation officers at every step. Soon after the court’s
opening, articles published across the country described its successes and cast it as “a kind of local Hague tribunal for the
home.”149
Other large cities followed New York’s lead. By the end of the
decade, domestic relations courts had opened in Buffalo (1910);
Chicago (1911); Boston (1912); Detroit (1913); Cincinnati,
Philadelphia, and Springfield, Massachusetts (1914); Dayton,
Ohio (1915); Richmond, Virginia (1916); Youngstown and
Summit, Ohio (1917); Portland, Oregon; Norfolk, Virginia; and
Lincoln and Omaha, Nebraska (1919).150 Probation was a central
feature in these courts, too. In the words of an incoming Detroit
judge, who had just toured other courts to prepare for his role, a
probation system was such “a positive necessity” that to not provide it “would be almost an official sin.”151 Reformers in other cities also proposed domestic relations courts but were unable to
overcome political opposition or state constitutions that made altering court jurisdiction too difficult.152
While the scope of these new courts somewhat varied, the
common thread and most common category on court dockets was
quasi-criminal or criminal nonsupport. Many of the earliest
adopters followed New York’s lead in delegating only nonsupport
matters.153 Others permitted somewhat broader jurisdiction (often concurrent with other courts, a perennial source of tension
and confusion), yet records indicate their tribunals focused primarily on nonsupport. For example, the Chicago court had jurisdiction over a range of unlawful adult-child conduct (such as selling tobacco to children and violating child labor laws) but
reported in its first year that nonsupport comprised more than

149

E.W., A Domestic Relations Court, St Louis Post-Dispatch 2 (Apr 14, 1912).
Boushy, The Historical Development of the Domestic Relations Court at *8, 156,
232–33, 256, 317, 411–17 (cited in note 16); Lincoln’s First Domestic Relations Court Begins to Straighten Out Family Tangles, Lincoln Star 13 (July 20, 1919); Bernard Flexner,
Reuben Oppenheimer, and Katharine F. Lenroot, The Child, the Family and the Court: A
Study of the Administration of Justice in the Field of Domestic Relations 65–67 (Bureau of
Publication 1929); Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Norfolk, Virginia: Fifty Year
History, 1919 to 1969 1 (Norfolk 1969).
151 Arthur J. Lacy, The Domestic Relations Court of the County of Wayne: Preliminary
Observations 5 (Conway Brief 1913).
152 For example, Wants Marital Court, Baltimore Sun 7 (Jan 16, 1913); Bill Is Drafted
for a Domestic Relations Court, St Louis Post-Dispatch A12B (Jan 3, 1915); For Family
Wars, LA Times II2 (Nov 2, 1914).
153 Edward F. Waite, Courts of Domestic Relations, 5 Minn L Rev 161, 164 (1921).
150
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70 percent of its caseload.154 Statistics collected over the next decade likewise showed that more than half of that court’s docket
was nonsupport.155 The two notable exceptions to the nonsupport
focus in the 1910s were the Detroit and Ohio tribunals, which
included divorce.156
Largely because of their focus on nonsupport, domestic relations courts were typically envisioned as “poor people’s courts.”
Poverty made men less able to provide and incentivized wives to
pursue formal interventions, so working class families were more
likely to fall within the courts’ purview.157 Many legal aid organizations refused to provide assistance for those seeking divorce,
leaving criminal nonsupport as the most readily available option
for the working class.158 By contrast, the wealthy could afford to
hire lawyers and pay court fees to secure separate maintenance
or divorce orders available in higher courts.159
Nevertheless, domestic relations courts were not the exclusive domain of the poor. In the context of early twentieth-century
urban living, many wives could not afford the costs in higher
courts, lacked the grounds necessary to prevail in such proceedings, or were opposed to formal separations for religious or social
reasons. And middle- or upper-class husbands might come on
hard times or feel justified in refusing to support wives who, without good cause in the men’s view, refused to live with them or
deprived them of their children’s company. For these reasons, as
newspaper articles plentifully document, middle-class and even
wealthy men were not immune to criminal proceedings.160 In fact,
wealthy men may have been attractive candidates for extradition
154 William H. Baldwin, The Court of Domestic Relations of Chicago, 3 J Crim L & Criminology 400 (1912); Sixth Annual Report of the Municipal Court of Chicago for the Year
December 4th A.D. 1911 to November 30th, A.D. 1912, Inclusive 84 (John F. Higgins 1912).
155 Cora M. Winchell, A Study of the Court of Domestic Relations of the City of Chicago
as an Agency in the Stabilization of the Home *2 (unpublished MA thesis, The University
of Chicago, 1921) (on file with author).
156 Arthur J. Lacy, What the Detroit Court of Domestic Relations Accomplished, 25 Am
Legal News 5, 10–13 (Sept 1914).
157 See, for example, Quick Justice for Poor at Low Cost Urged by Hughes, St Louis
Post-Dispatch 3 (Aug 27, 1920); The Poor and the Law, Greenville News (South Carolina)
4 (Nov 30, 1919).
158 Reginald Heber Smith, Justice and the Poor: A Study of the Present Denial of Justice to the Poor and of the Agencies Making More Equal Their Position before the Law with
Particular Reference to Legal Aid Work in the United States 155 (Scribner 1921).
159 See Part I.A.
160 For example, Broker Must Support Wife, NY Times 6 (Mar 9, 1911); M’Donald Heir
Gets Delay, Chi Daily Trib 8 (June 7, 1912); Dr. Morris Still Held, NY Times 7 (June 29,
1912); Ex-Magistrate Jailed, NY Trib 2 (May 6, 1913).
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because of the likelihood that the expense of transporting them
would prove worthwhile.161
Probation-backed, criminal domestic relations courts greatly
improved dependents’ ability to secure financial support from delinquent breadwinners, as compared to earlier civil options. According to one expert who studied the administration of justice in
the late 1910s, the criminal approach to nonsupport was simpler
and cheaper. A wife participating in a criminal case need not hire
a lawyer because a court clerk assisted her in completing newly
simplified forms to initiate suit, the probation department (“an
indispensable adjunct of every domestic relations court”162) collected necessary evidence and, depending on location, a probation
officer (informally) or a government prosecutor represented the
wife’s interests during the trial, which was typically quick.
Whereas civil orders in other courts “inevitably” led to the additional cost and delay of contempt litigation to secure payments,
criminal suits meant a probation officer was tasked with overseeing collection and initiating summary proceedings for noncompliance. The expert thus predicted that “the territorial expansion of
domestic relations courts will be rapid.”163
B. Probation Organizations and the “Family Court” Proposal
Because probation officers received significant employment
and positive publicity from handling nonsupport cases, they were
deeply invested in the success and spread of specialized domestic
relations courts. They and their organizations pressed for the
opening of these institutions in new locations and, by the late
1910s, for the expansion of the tribunals into “family courts,” with
jurisdiction over other family litigation as well.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, probation officers
began formulating a distinct professional identity and founded

161 For examples of wealthy men extradited for nonsupport, see John A. Farwell Is
Arrested as Wife Deserter, Chi Daily Trib 15 (July 12, 1919) (“Chicago real estate man”
whose mother had inherited almost a million dollars); Brooklyn Pitcher Waives Extradition, Hartford Courant 17 (Sept 6, 1917); To Face Wife’s Non-Support Charge: Art Dealer
Is Taken East after Fight against Extradition, LA Times 18 (June 18, 1918); To Extradite
Twombly, NY Times 22 (Dec 1, 1931) (“inventor and millionaire”).
162 Smith, Justice and the Poor at 78 (cited in note 158).
163 Id at 76, 78–80, 82.
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organizations to improve and promote their work. The most influential of their associations was the NPA, formed in 1907.164 From
its early years, the NPA supported the establishment of specialized domestic relations courts to better treat nonsupport cases,
and many of its members were domestic relations probation officers and judges.165 By the time of the NPA’s annual conference in
1916, the first year for which full records are available, the presidential address described domestic relations courts as “an outgrowth of probation” and suggested: “Any community which has
not established a domestic relations court is neglectful of its welfare.”166 During the same meeting, the NPA created the “Committee on Courts of Domestic Relations,” then one of only four permanent committees. The organization also enshrined a focus on
domestic relations courts in its bylaws.167
Newspaper articles, conference proceedings, and commissioned reports demonstrate that the NPA promoted domestic relations courts with probation staffs and worked to strengthen and
standardize the tribunals across jurisdictions. 168 By 1920, the
NPA president referred to courts of domestic relations as “essentially probation courts,” and declared that “probation work in the
family courts is really the heart of the probation service in any
system.”169
The NPA and other likeminded reformers were crucial participants in spreading the domestic relations court model, but
they were less successful in their effort to expand the courts’
jurisdiction to encompass two areas of law they saw as interrelated: juvenile delinquency and divorce.170 Beginning in the late
164 John J. Gascoyne, The Judge and the Probation Officer, in The Progress of Probation: Annual Report and Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference of the National Probation Association 110, 112 (National Probation Association 1916).
165 See, for example, Probation for Counties, Baltimore Sun 5 (May 12, 1915). Probation officers also promoted stronger nonsupport laws. See, for example, Bill Will Take Care
of Deserted Families, Atlanta Const G5 (Aug 3, 1913).
166 Frank E. Wade, President’s Address, in The Progress of Probation 12, 18 (cited in
note 164).
167 The Progress of Probation at 4, 9, 115, 132 (cited in note 164).
168 For example, Would Reorganize Probation Bureau, Baltimore Sun 28 (Mar 21,
1928); Social Problems Up for Discussion, Palm Beach Post 6 (Mar 10, 1929).
169 Edwin J. Cooley, Tendencies and Developments in the Field of Probation, in Social
Service in the Courts: Annual Report and Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Conference
of the National Probation Association 19, 31 (National Probation Association 1920); Edwin
J. Cooley, The Administrative versus the Treatment Aspects of Probation, in Social Service
in the Courts at 103, 110.
170 Asks Wider Courts to Avert Divorces: National Probation Group Urges Tribunals
That Can Keep the Family Intact, NY Times 15 (Apr 26, 1928).
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1910s, NPA members argued that combining criminal
nonsupport, juvenile delinquency, and divorce into a unified
“family court” would reduce jurisdictional overlap and ensure
deep, rehabilitative treatment by probation officers across familyrelated conflicts.171 Probation supervision was already commonplace in juvenile courts. Judges and commenters typically justified placing children on probation pursuant to the chancery doctrine of parens patriae. 172 By contrast, courts rarely used
probation officers in divorce—a context in which neither the
state’s criminal powers nor parens patriae reached. The usefulness of probation in nonsupport led some to envision probation
officers performing many of the same duties in divorce cases:
attempting reconciliations, investigating home life, and overseeing alimony payments.173
Family court advocates encountered strong opposition.
Juvenile-focused discussants feared the proposed merger would
harm the functioning of juvenile courts by reintroducing the criminal posture they had worked hard to minimize and by diverting
precious resources.174 Legal experts emphasized the difficulty in
combining these matters within existing court structures, as the
three categories of cases “cut across the arbitrary lines . . . between civil and criminal jurisdiction and between inferior and
general jurisdiction.”175 Lawyers objected to moving divorce litigation because it might hurt their bottom line by rendering their
services unnecessary. Others saw political impediments based on
cost or general doubt about court reform.176 Thus, although the

171 Charles W. Hoffman, Developments in Family Court Work, in Social Treatment of
the Delinquent, Annual Report and Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the
National Probation Association 55 (National Probation Association 1921); Charles L.
Chute, Probation and Suspended Sentence, 12 J Crim L & Criminology 558, 563–64 (1921).
172 On the use of probation in juvenile courts, see Ellen Ryerson, The Best-Laid Plans:
America’s Juvenile Court Experiment 63–71 (Hill & Wang 1978).
173 See, for example, Edward F. Waite, Social Aspects of Minneapolis Courts, 6 Minn
L Rev 259, 269 (1922) (suggesting the “pitiful inefficiency” shown in collecting alimony
could be improved by probation).
174 National Probation Association, A Standard Juvenile Court Law 4, 12–13 (1926).
175 Editorial, 3 J Am Jud Soc 3, 4 (1919); Smith, Justice and the Poor at 82 (cited in
note 158) (“There is a gulf, fixed by history and tradition, between civil and criminal matters that will not easily be bridged.”).
176 James Hoge Ricks, Report of the Committee on Family Courts, in The Social Service of the Courts, Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the National Probation Association 119, 121–26 (National Probation Association 1923) (discussing reform obstacles, including lawyer opposition, in Virginia).
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NPA’s family court proposal inspired change in some places, overall it resulted in a splintered view of what family-focused courts
could and should do.177
The mixed success of the NPA proposal led to variation in the
dozens of domestic relations and family courts that were reformed
or founded in the 1920s and 1930s,178 yet the common ingredients
remained jurisdiction over criminal nonsupport and the use of
probation.179 So central were these components that locations unable to open specialized courts imported similar approaches.
Many places grouped nonsupport cases on designated days or before specific judges and modeled their probation or like services
on successful domestic relations court examples. 180 Thus, while
there was diversity in the organization and jurisdiction of courts,
in the words of the Omaha, Nebraska, family court judge, “the
method of handling these family cases is usually similar.” More
specifically, the judge observed: “Effective probation work is the
heart and soul of a successful family court.”181
III. FROM CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT TO “CIVIL” CHILD SUPPORT
(1933–1950S)
Though criminal family courts with probation staffs rendered
nonsupport enforcement more effective than under the preexisting options, critics increasingly identified procedural and practical disadvantages of the criminal law. In 1933, New Yorkers designed a “civil” nonsupport law that mirrored criminal
enforcement in its use of probation and incarceration and that retained further state power by allowing judges to revert to criminal
law when preferable. This approach, while addressing some problems, did not reach men outside the state. The solution that prevailed by the 1950s was nationwide passage of a uniform reciprocal law that allowed the civil enforcement of family support duties

177

Hoffman, Developments in Family Court Work at 55–56 (cited in note 171).
A US Children’s Bureau publication attempting to summarize the terrain in 1929
identified “at least” five “different types of organization” for institutions labeled “court of
domestic relations” or “family court,” and each contained its own variation. Flexner, Oppenheimer, and Lenroot, The Child, the Family and the Court at 15–17 (cited in note 150).
179 See Chester Vernier, 3 American Family Laws: A Comparative Study of the Family
Law of the Forty-Eight American States, Alaska, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii (to
Jan. 1, 1935) 141–43 (Stanford 1935).
180 See, for example, Restoring Peace, St Louis Post-Dispatch at B4 (cited in note 108).
181 L.B. Day, The Development of the Family Court, 136 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc
Sci 105, 110 (1928).
178
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across state lines. Reciprocal enforcement required extensive involvement by court staff, a marked departure from the civil options available in prior decades. Because state employee participation and oversight had been normalized in criminal cases, most
observers did not find this development problematic. All states
retained criminal law for deterrence and to use against the most
incorrigible offenders, but civil suits became more attractive and
therefore more frequent. Federalization later reinforced the civilcriminal scheme.
As the 1950s progressed, family court dockets became
weighted toward civil matters because of the shift to civil
nonsupport and incorporation of divorce jurisdiction. Despite
these changes, the courts’ powers, procedures, and personnel retained elements of their criminal origins. The influence and involvement of the state—cultivated in the context of criminal support litigation and embodied in the probation officer—was
preserved in the “civil” family courts. Incarceration for noncompliance was ever-present, either through contempt or under the
retained criminal laws.
A. “Novel and Ingenious”: “Civil” Support Enforcement
By the early 1930s, social welfare leaders and lawyers identified drawbacks to criminal nonsupport laws and domestic relations courts. At the same time, they wished to preserve the relatively robust staffing and coercive powers developed in the
criminal context. New York reformers were again at the forefront,
devising a “civil” nonsupport law and court that retained the core
components of the criminal approach: probation and
incarceration.
Social, economic, and legal developments coalesced to partially undermine the attractiveness of criminal nonsupport laws.
Women’s increasing political and economic power prompted
questions about whether severe sanctions were appropriate when
husbands failed to support them.182 Widespread unemployment
during the Great Depression raised awareness that the harshness
of criminal law might be unfair or counterproductive.183 By the
late 1920s, social welfare leaders advocated handling nonsupport
182 See, for example, Arthur Stringer, It Is the Man Who Pays and Pays: Modern
Woman Is Civilization’s Gate-Crasher, Receives More and Gives Less, Breaks Laws, and
Depends on Sex-Charm to Evade Justice, Hartford Courant C5 (Dec 26, 1926).
183 See, for example, Domestic Court’s Data Lays Strife to Lack of Work, Brooklyn
Daily Eagle 4A (Sept 27, 1931).
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as a “social” rather than criminal problem to facilitate rehabilitation 184 and reduce “unnecessary stigma.” 185 Meanwhile, lawyers
condemned state-level criminal procedure’s “red tape” 186 and
“loopholes” for causing delays. 187 Compounding the pessimistic
take on criminal enforcement in New York, an investigation into
New York City’s inferior criminal court system—of which the
domestic relations court remained part—revealed widespread
corruption.188
These concerns, in conjunction with the influence of the
NPA’s “family court” model, motivated New Yorkers to lobby their
legislature to remove the domestic relations court from the inferior criminal court system.189 In 1933, New York legislators responded by creating a standalone family court they somewhat
confusedly called a “Domestic Relations Court.” This court had
two divisions: a “Family Court” (focused on nonsupport) and a
“Children’s Court” (for juvenile delinquency and some offenses
committed against children).190
One goal of the Family Court division, as compared to its predecessor domestic relations court, was to lessen the tribunal’s reputation as only serving poor people.191 The statute removed the
public charge requirement for eligibility, allowed judges to grant
more generous awards (“a fair and reasonable sum”), 192 and

184 See, for example, Magistrates Urge Sweeping Reforms, NY Times 1 (Dec 30, 1931);
Charities Bureau Urges Passage of Family Court Bill, Brooklyn Daily Eagle 6
(Mar 7, 1932).
185 Committee on Criminal Courts of the Charity Organization Society of the City of
New York, Proposed Changes in Family Court (Nov 3, 1928), Community Service Society
Archives, Box 110, Courts Committee Folder, Rare Book and Manuscript Library,
Columbia University.
186 American Law Institute Drafts Code for Uniform Laws in the States, 2 NY St Bar
Assn Bull 112, 112 (1930). See also O’Brien Drafts Bill to Merge 2 Courts, NY Times 7 (Mar
24, 1933) (litigants in domestic relations courts “were poor and could not afford the delays
caused by the present red tape”).
187 Henry Epstein, Reforms in Criminal Law: Statutes Enacted at the Special Session
of the N.Y. Legislature, 3 NY St Bar Assn Bull 451, 451 (1931).
188 Seabury Describes Abuses in Magistrates’ Courts through Politics and Proposes
Reforms, NY Herald Trib 8 (Mar 28, 1932). There was dissatisfaction with inferior criminal courts in other locations, too. For example, Alan Johnstone Jr, Suggestions for Reform
in Criminal Procedure, 125 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 94 (1926).
189 Jonah J. Goldstein, The Family in Court, 1932 Natl Probation Assn Yearbook 168.
190 Clarence M. Lewis, New Domestic Relations Court of New York City, 5 NY St Bar
Assn Bull 484–90 (1933).
191 For rationales, see Committee on Criminal Courts of the Charity Organization
Society of the City of New York, Proposed Changes in Family Court (cited in note 185).
192 Domestic Relations Court Act, 1933 NY Laws ch 482, § 101(1).
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absorbed jurisdiction over nonpayment of alimony. Providers submitted both types of payments through a Support Bureau.193 Still,
if a poor person did not seek support, a charitable association or
public official retained the right, inspired by the poor law, to file
on the person’s behalf to protect taxpayers.194
The statute also included a dramatic change in the options
available to enforce men’s support duties. While retaining the
criminal nonsupport option, the law additionally permitted
judges to enter support orders following civil proceedings. Moreover, judges had the authority to transform matters initially designated as civil into criminal actions or vice versa whenever they
believed doing so would be advantageous.195 State-level criminal
procedure protections—such as the right to cross-examine witnesses—remained obligatory only when the court proceeded under the law denominated “criminal.”196 This gave judges significant discretion. In the words of a New York lawyer reviewing the
changes, the 1933 law sought “to create elasticity of procedure
and punishment.”197
Crucially, the court could use incarceration and probation under both the civil and criminal paths. If a person failed to comply
with a civil support order, the court could “commit [him] to jail for
a term not to exceed twelve months,”198 in other words for contempt of court. Or, it could find a defendant “guilty of nonsupport” and “punish [him] by imprisonment in jail for not exceeding twelve months.”199 Under both options, the court retained
the discretion to release the person early on probation in furtherance of “the best interests of the family and the community.”200
This meant the court’s contempt power and criminal sentencing
power were virtually identical to each other and to previous

193

Annual Report of the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York 62 (1933).
Lewis, 5 NY St Bar Assn Bull at 491 (cited in note 190).
195 Id. A law passed in 1978 added that a judge who converted a civil proceeding into
a criminal action must then transfer it to a criminal court. The amended version of the
law in force today requires consent from the petitioner for this conversion. NY Family
Court Act § 813 (2018).
196 Lewis, New Domestic Relations Court, 5 NY St Bar Assn Bull at 491
(cited in note 190).
197 Id at 484.
198 Domestic Relations Court Act, 1933 NY Laws ch 482, § 92(12).
199 Domestic Relations Court Act, 1933 NY Laws ch 482, § 102.
200 Domestic Relations Court Act, 1933 NY Laws ch 482, § 92(15). The court also had
the power to hear certain criminal family conflicts (including domestic violence) if the parties were already before it for a nonsupport matter. Annual Report of the Domestic Relations Court at 33–36 (1933) (cited in note 193).
194
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practice. As one supporter trumpeted, the court could “deal with
recalcitrant persons as heretofore.”201
Although the text of the Domestic Relations Court Act did not
state that the new tribunal was “civil,” officials and observers understood it as such. In the language of the court’s first annual report: “The most outstanding change is the fundamental shift in
the character of jurisdiction from criminal to civil.” 202 Adjustments to vocabulary added to the civil veneer; for instance, “respondent” replaced “defendant.”203
Proponents and court staff recognized and welcomed the strategic reinforcement of so-called civil law with retained criminal
powers. In explanatory publicity materials, social welfare leaders
who had helped draft the law cast their blending of civil and criminal components as “novel and [i]ngenious.” The legislation removed the family court from the criminal system and rendered its
procedure “almost entirely a Civil One,” a pamphlet explained.
Yet “[w]hile the procedure in future will be chiefly civil,” it continued,
the Power to Proceed under Criminal Procedure is Retained
as it must be—for, on last analysis, if a husband refuses to
obey the orders of the court to support his wife, the only effective way of dealing with him is to send him to jail. To impose a civil judgment upon him that is uncollectible is an
empty gesture.204
In short, the new court design deliberately blended civil and
criminal components in a manner far more explicit and strategic
than any previous family tribunal had done. State involvement—
primarily through probation oversight, centralized collection and
disbursement of payments, and the threat or reality of incarceration—was now a key ingredient in civil support enforcement. The
criminal-laced civil machinery nearly eliminated incentives to
turn to criminal law. Detailed statistical analyses published in
the court’s annual reports in the following years provided no indication that any cases were pursued as “criminal,” even as the
201 Charles Zunser, The New Domestic Relations Court of New York; How Does It
Work?, 14 Jewish Soc Serv Q 372, 376–77 (1938).
202 Annual Report of the Domestic Relations Court at 33 (1933) (cited in note 193).
203 See id at 34.
204 Committee on Criminal Courts of the Charity Organization Society of the City of
New York, The New Domestic Relations Court Law: Some of its Principal Features (June
1, 1933), Community Service Society Archives, Box 114, Domestic Relations Folder, Rare
Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.
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court used warrants, probation, and incarceration. 205 A decade
into the court’s operation, one of its judges explained to employees
that though the court was “deemed to be essentially a court of
civil jurisdiction,” it “savors of the criminal law.”206
The first New York Court of Appeals case probing the civilcriminal blend offered almost no discussion, deferring to the legislature’s removal of such cases from the criminal court system as
dispositive evidence of civil character. After acknowledging “there
seemed to be some confusion” about whether certain proceedings
under the Domestic Relations Court Act were civil or criminal,
the court held: “We now say that these proceedings are no longer
of a criminal nature as they have shifted to the civil side of the
courts.”207
New York’s strategic melding of civil and criminal components became influential.208 In 1943, the NPA praised New York
City as having “among the most progressive” and “best nonsupport laws in the country.”209 Reflecting this view, a Miami family court judge speaking at an NPA conference the following year
suggested that “[t]he best thought seems to favor making such
courts civil in nature” in order to “escape from the technicalities
of criminal courts.” Civil contempt offered these courts speed and
other procedural advantages, he observed, yet the courts should
retain criminal powers to use when civil methods failed. 210 In
1949, the NPA credited and followed New York’s approach when
crafting a model nonsupport law.211
205 See, for example, Annual Report of the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New
York 15 (1938).
206 W. Bruce Cobb, The Domestic Relations Court Act, in Functions and Procedures of
the Domestic Relations Court: Inservice Training Course 2 (Division of War Training 1944).
207 Kane v Necci, 198 NE 613, 615 (NY 1935) (involving stepparent liability for indigent children). Subsequent cases relied on Kane without providing deeper analysis. For
example, People v Rogers, 248 AD 141 (NY 1936). New York practice resources still cite
Kane in explaining that jail terms for nonpayment of child support are of a “civil nature.”
See Callaghan’s Family Court Law and Practice NY, 1 NY Fam Ct Law & Prac § 6:4
(2017).
208 It would be valuable for future historical studies to trace and compare other states’
approaches in greater depth. Initial findings indicate that strategic fluidity between criminal law, civil law, and contempt was common but sometimes followed other patterns. See,
for example, Petition of Kelley, 197 NE 861 (Mass 1935) (affirming finding of contempt in
course of criminal prosecution for nonsupport).
209 National Probation Association, A Standard Juvenile Court Act 14, 28 (1943).
210 Walter Beckham, One Court for Family Problems, in Social Defenses against
Crimes, Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Probation
Association 80, 81–83 (National Probation Association 1942).
211 National Probation and Parole Association, A Standard Juvenile Court Act
37–40 (1949).
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The legislature in Turner’s home state of South Carolina was
among those persuaded. In 1935, Charleston followed New York
City when it became the first city in its state to open a domestic
relations court.212 Unsurprisingly, South Carolinian judges found
that the option to “enforce its decrees by punishment for contempt”213 reduced their need to turn to the state’s preexisting misdemeanor statute.214 A South Carolina domestic relations judge
captured this perspective when he opined in the 1950s:
“Contempt is my favorite weapon.”215
B. A Civil Alternative to Extradition
Though the relabeling of criminal nonsupport as civil solved
some problems, a substantial weakness remained: how to efficiently handle desertion across state lines. Because the criminal
laws enacted in earlier decades were not repealed, extradition remained available. In practice, however, the cost undermined the
utility. As one family court judge observed in a speech to the NPA
in 1942, the expense of pursuing “such a fugitive is frequently
greater than the amount to be collected.” 216 Similarly, the
Brooklyn District Attorney estimated that it would cost $600,000
per year to extradite all deserting husbands, whereas the entire
annual extradition budget was between $5,000 and $6,000. Extradition might be a complete waste, as there was no guarantee
the men would then support their dependents.217
Extradition was also legally complex. Questions arose about
whether a man was a “fugitive from justice,” as required for the
Extradition Clause to apply, if he left his wife for a legitimate,
temporary reason (such as looking for work) and only later decided not to return to her. 218 Finally, nonsupport cases became

212 Charles H. Miller, National Probation Association, The Domestic Relations Court
and Related Agencies of Charleston, South Carolina 7–8 (1945).
213 Id at 6.
214 South Carolina criminalized family abandonment in 1912. State v English, 85 SE
721, 722 (SC 1915) (discussing misdemeanor statute).
215 Lions Club Hears Report on Court in Greenville, Index-Journal (Greenwood, SC)
1, 10 (Apr 20, 1956).
216 Beckham, One Court for Family Problems at 86 (cited in note 210).
217 Judith Crist, Reciprocal Laws in All States Urged to Curb Wife Deserters, NY
Herald Trib A5 (Sept 26, 1948); Katherine Blanck, Woman A.D.A. Fights for Abandonment
Law, Brooklyn Daily Eagle 7 (June 5, 1941).
218 See, for example, Texas Refusal on Extradition Termed Illegal, Austin Am Statesman 1 (Feb 24, 1925).
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tied up in broader disputes about whether extradition was
discretionary.219
In 1941, Grace Clyde Seaman, the Assistant District Attorney responsible for the Abandonment Bureau in Brooklyn, turned
her attention to finding an alternative to extradition. She first
proposed a federal criminal law, which she envisioned would be
heard in children’s divisions within federal courts.220 After several
years of publicizing this approach to no avail, Seaman and her
colleagues developed a new idea: civil reciprocal laws enforced in
family courts.221 For a civil suit to be pursuable when litigants
were in different states, the legislature needed to expressly provide this jurisdiction to the family court. Moreover, to be worthwhile, states needed to agree in advance that they would
cooperate regardless of whether their own court had jurisdiction
over the provider or the dependents. Passage of compatible reciprocal enforcement laws could achieve this goal.222
The New York legislature led the effort to create a reciprocal
enforcement web when it passed such legislation in 1948. This
early iteration was tacked onto the 1933 Domestic Relations
Court Act but, recognizing that this approach made it difficult for
other states to copy and thereby impeded reciprocity, the legislature repealed and replaced it with a standalone act the next year:
the Uniform Support of Dependents Law (USDL).223 The USDL
adopted core parts of the Domestic Relations Court Act—such as
judicial discretion to award “a fair and reasonable sum,” the involvement of a state attorney to represent the dependent, and
oversight by probation officers. The essential provision provided
that the family court could now apply the law when a petitioner,
respondent, or both were in the state. Although the USDL did not
carry over the Domestic Relations Court Act’s option of transforming civil suits into criminal petitions (likely because experience showed reverting to criminal law was rarely necessary), it
provided that a respondent who willfully failed to comply with a

219 For example, Renew Extradition Row, NY Times 3 (May 28, 1938). On resistance
to extradition on public policy grounds, see generally Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 NC L Rev 149 (2013); Eric W. Rise, Crime, Comity and Civil Rights: The
NAACP and the Extradition of Southern Black Fugitives, 55 Am J Legal Hist 119 (2015).
220 Mother’s Plight Cited in Move for New Court, Brooklyn Daily Eagle 4
(Feb 16, 1944).
221 Dewey Signs Bill to Nip Runaway Husbands, Brooklyn Daily Eagle 3 (Apr 8, 1948).
222 Crist, Reciprocal Laws, NY Herald Trib at A5 (cited in note 217).
223 Harold V. McCoy, Uniform Support of Dependents Law, 24 St John’s L Rev 162,
163–65 (1949).
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court order or probation should be punished in the same manner
as for noncompliance in other cases.224 For many states, this included civil contempt imprisonment. Thus, the USDL maintained
the probation surveillance and incarceration powers of earlier
criminal nonsupport laws but within a civil framing. Moreover,
the statute clarified it was “an additional or alternative civil remedy” that should not “affect or impair any other remedy, civil or
criminal.”225
New York’s civil reciprocal law received nationwide attention, including from the Council of State Governments, and was
soon adopted in other states. 226 As more states joined, the law
gained momentum with the promise of wider reciprocity. In contrast to the options that predated criminalization, the USDL provided a strong and procedurally clear mechanism for interstate
enforcement.227
Meanwhile, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had
begun reevaluating the Uniform Act of 1910, prompted, by their
own account, by an article published in Cosmopolitan Magazine
in 1942.228 The Commissioners recognized that no state had enacted the Uniform Act for decades and that adopting states had
modified it beyond the point of it actually providing uniformity.
Thus, the Commissioners considered how to revise the law to fit
new circumstances and to settle lingering questions about applicability to dependents not likely to become public charges.
They suggested “the better view” was that the criminal statutes
should “supplement civil remedies against the husband or
father.”229
The Commissioners’ discussions in the following years reveal
that they still conceived of the solution to interstate enforcement
as coming from criminal law. They were deeply troubled, however, by the application of criminal law to mid-century families.
While their 1910 predecessors envisioned that extradition would
bring a husband back to a home in which he previously lived with

224

1949 NY Sess Laws § 807(6)(m).
1949 NY Sess Laws § 807. See also Vincenza v Vincenza, 197 Misc 1027, 1028–29
(NY Dom Rel Ct 1950) (discussing relationship between 1933 Act and USDL).
226 Clarence Woodbury, What to Do about Runaway Husbands, Minneapolis Star 12
(Aug 22, 1949).
227 See McCoy, 24 St John’s L Rev at 162 (cited in note 223).
228 Report of Uniform Torts and Criminal Law Acts Section on Uniform Desertion and
Non-Support Act, in Handbook of the Fifty-Second National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the Annual Conference Meeting 233, 234 (1942).
229 Id at 235.
225
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his wife and possibly lead to a reconciliation, the Commissioners
of the 1940s thought extradition meant removing a man from a
good job and sending him to a state where he perhaps never lived.
The wife could, one discussant worried, “go to any one of the fortyseven states that she chooses, and make that man a criminal in
the state of her choice.”230 Aside from providing too much power
to the wife, they thought this scenario might not pass constitutional muster. Furthermore, once in the wife’s state, the man
would be imprisoned at public expense, helping no one. But if the
Commissioners instead created a framework in which a man was
prosecuted wherever he was located, that setup incentivized him
to forum shop for the state with the weakest law. Unable to identify a clear path forward, they cycled through several drafts.231
By their 1949 meeting, the Commissioners had learned about
the USDL, which had already been passed in twelve states, raising their interest in a law that included civil enforcement components, too.232 In 1950, the Commissioners released the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).233 URESA contained both criminal and civil machinery to facilitate enforcement
of substantive laws already on the books in adopting states (in
contrast to the USDL, which included both substantive law and
reciprocity).
The Criminal Enforcement section of URESA was brief and
focused on easing extradition by outlining the requirements and
procedures. The most innovative provision permitted extradition
of a person who was not a fugitive from justice, thus extending
extradition to more scenarios than required under the Constitution’s Extradition Clause and requiring proof on fewer points.234
As the most prominent promoter of URESA later explained, the
drafters retained the criminal approach because they were
uncertain whether civil suits would cover all situations, and they
anticipated that “the threat of extradition might be a powerful
weapon in the case of shiftless and slippery obligors.”235

230 Proceedings in Committee of the Whole: Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act
16–17 (Sept 2, 1948).
231 Id.
232 Proceedings in Committee of the Whole: Model Reciprocal Non-Support Act and/or
Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act (Aug 31, 1949).
233 Proceedings in Committee of the Whole: Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (Sept 12, 1950).
234 Id at 4–5.
235 William J. Brockelbank, Interstate Enforcement of Family Support (The Runaway
Pappy Act) 15, 21 (Bobbs-Merrill 1960) (emphasis in original).
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URESA’s Civil Enforcement portion was far lengthier, covering complex choice of law issues and detailed procedural prescriptions. The URESA framework imposed duties on both initiating
and responding states to exchange paperwork; hold appropriate
hearings; and accept, track, and transmit payment. The court
with jurisdiction over the obligor could require the person to make
regular payments to a clerk or probation department and to report to the same regularly. URESA also allowed states or localities to pursue reimbursement of expenditures made on behalf of
a dependent. Punishment for noncompliance followed ordinary
rules for contempt of court, which could include incarceration.236
All forty-eight states and several US territories adopted either URESA or USDL (which were interchangeable for purposes
of states being able to cooperate with each other) by 1955, greatly
boosting recovery of support under civil law approaches.237 Civil
law now seemed clearly superior to criminal law in most situations. A representative newspaper article summed up the benefits
of the civil reciprocal regime: “No criminal action, no extradition,
no loss of job.”238 Several cities reported upturns in the number of
cases and amount collected. 239 New York City’s Domestic Relations Court recorded a major increase, attributed to the reciprocal
laws, from $473,468 in 1953 to $747,346 in 1954.240
Heightened collections helped justify the costs associated
with running the civil reciprocal system. The Assistant US Attorney responsible for these matters for DC expected that URESA
would permit him to handle around 90 percent of nonsupport
cases as more “efficient” civil matters. Though he estimated the
larger caseload would require ten people, he reasoned that “the
cost of staff to handle the cases might be balanced” by reducing
welfare rolls.241 In this way, the public purpose of support enforcement validated the retention of prosecutorial involvement within
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Id at 85.
Report of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation
281 (1955). Although the procedures did not always work smoothly, state officials began
holding annual meetings to work through problems and draft amendments. Id at 286–98.
238 James Clayton, Absent Fathers Court Headache, Wash Post & Times Herald D16
(Nov 4, 1956).
239 Joint Legislative Committee at 282–85 (cited in note 237).
240 Id at 281.
241 Clayton, Absent Fathers, Wash Post & Times Herald at D16 (cited in note 238).
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a so-called civil scheme.242 Aiding the prosecutorial staff, courts
repurposed probation officers as filers of contempt petitions.243
After all states had passed reciprocal laws, an account celebrated how cooperation under civil law “left runaway fathers with
no place to hide,” yet offered the option of jail when needed. “While
desertion is a crime in every State, the machinery for extraditing
and trying a runaway father on criminal charges is cumbersome
and rarely invoked,” the article explained. “The great advantage of
the new system is that it operates under civil, rather than criminal,
procedures.” 244 Similarly, a family law expert at Columbia Law
School observed that civil interstate enforcement had, by 1953, “already made the felony proceeding (abandonment) virtually obsolete.” 245 These developments likely help explain the turn to the
more civil-sounding terminology “child support,” which entered the
lexicon in 1939, grew dramatically in the 1950s, and surpassed
“nonsupport” by around 1960.246
A series of legal attacks on USDL’s and URESA’s intermingling of civil and criminal components failed. In the first
USDL case to reach a state supreme court, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the propriety of using public funds to pay
prosecutors to represent wives in “private lawsuits” for civil support because it saw “no apparent reason” to distinguish these
suits from analogous criminal cases. Both types of proceedings,
the court reasoned, shared the same objective: “to coerce the husband or father to comply with an obligation which otherwise
would fall on the public generally.”247 In other words, the public
purpose justified reliance on criminal-style personnel, even when
the proceedings were “civil.” After a series of legislative refinements and court cases, states reached uniformity in providing the
242 Newspaper coverage in some states reported that URESA assigned responsibility
for administering the law to state attorneys without a commensurate increase in resources. For example, Percy Hamilton, ‘URESA’ Ends Refuge for Runaway Fathers,
Pensacola News-Journal 36 (Apr 1, 1962).
243 For evidence of this role, see Fathers Cited for Contempt, Decatur Herald (Decatur,
Ill) 3 (Aug 8, 1947); Furtado v Furtado, 402 NE2d 1024, 1033 (Mass 1980) (dismissing
defendant’s argument that probation officer’s role in filing contempt “complaint” for nonsupport constituted unauthorized practice of law).
244 Louis Cassels, Running Fathers Can’t Hide Now, LA Times A2 (Nov 6, 1957).
245 Walter Gellhorn to J. Howard Rossbach, April 23, 1953, Walter Gellhorn Papers,
Box 19, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.
246 Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) identifies 1939 as the earliest “child
support” usage, though I found a few earlier examples. For example, “Child-Support” Law
Interpreted, SF Chron 20 (May 3, 1913). On the use of this terminology in later decades,
see Google Ngrams on file with author.
247 Duncan v Smith, 262 SW2d 373, 377 (Ky 1953).
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assistance of a state attorney “closely akin to the prosecuting attorney,” regardless of whether the beneficiary parent and child
received public assistance.248 Judges justified this result on the
basis that “[t]he collection of child support ultimately benefits the
State,” even when it is disbursed to a private party.249
Despite recognizing parallels between the civil and criminal
suits, courts hearing USDL and URESA appeals relied on the
civil label to dismiss men’s procedural objections. Judges denied
claims that defendants had constitutional rights to receive jury
trials and to confront witnesses against them.250 In 1956, the New
York Court of Appeals characterized reciprocal support
statutes as “quasi-criminal in nature” but held criminal Due Process inapplicable on the basis that the proceedings were held in
“civil court” and did not apply fines or penalties (instead relying on
contempt). The US Supreme Court summarily dismissed the case
“for want of a substantial federal question.”251 Thus, under the reciprocal statutes, defendants faced state personnel and powers
typical of the criminal context, but without criminal procedure
protections.
While reciprocal statutes improved civil enforcement, observers still recognized value in maintaining criminal law. The most
prominent group to express this view was the American Law Institute, which met beginning in 1956 to draft the Model Penal
Code (MPC), with the goal of standardizing and modernizing
state laws.252 In an outline of the issues the drafters faced, they

248 Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v Terry, 985 SW2d 711, 714–17 (Ark
1999) (asserting that, as a technical matter, the custodial parent assigns her rights to the
state agency, even though the collected money “will ultimately pass from the State”
to her).
249 Id at 716. See also Haney v Oklahoma, 850 P2d 1087, 1091 (Okla 1993) (“[T]he
State has a pecuniary interest in child-support enforcement regardless of whether or not
the custodial parent is [a welfare] recipient.”).
250 Brockelbank, Interstate Enforcement of Family Support at 25–26 (cited in note
235) (noting lawyers’ confusion regarding the criminal versus civil nature of URESA and
discussing failed legal challenges). See also R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Statutes Providing for Reciprocal Enforcement of Duty to Support Dependents, 42 ALR2d 768 (1955). The civil character of URESA suits also meant subsequent
criminal actions were not res judicata. State v Greenberg, 109 A2d 669, 673 (NJ 1954).
251 Landes v Landes, 135 NE2d 562 (NY 1956), summarily dismissed, 352 US 948
(1956) (per curiam). Other challenges to denial of criminal procedures were dismissed because relevant protections had not yet been recognized or incorporated against the states.
See, for example, Smith v Smith, 270 P2d 613, 621 (Cal App 1954) (dismissing Fifth
Amendment challenges to URESA proceedings).
252 See generally Paul H. Robinson and Markus D. Dubber, The American Model
Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 New Crim L Rev 319 (2007).
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included: “Is it justifiable to preserve criminal non-support, despite general belief that civil (and social service-type) proceedings
are preferable, in order to keep the prosecutors in the business as
legal aid for indigent wives?”253 While the question oversimplified
the purpose and consequences of criminal nonsupport laws, it
captured a key component. Criminal law brought state employee
assistance to wives who could not afford lawyers.
The MPC drafters concluded that “ideally” nonsupport would
be pursued as a civil matter but that there were “important reasons” not to abandon the criminal option. First, criminal law involved prosecutors in the process. “While this is not a desirable
role for prosecutors in commercial transactions,” they acknowledged, “it may be very important” for indigent dependents living
far from legal aid offices. Second, criminal law provided extradition, although URESA made this less necessary. And finally,
criminal law contributed deterrence. They speculated that the existence of criminal law could both sway individual men’s decisions
and “reinforc[e] the moral disapproval” attached to nonsupport.254
The blended civil-criminal approach was further bolstered by
federal law. Congress had long resisted reformers’ attempts to
draw the federal government into family support enforcement255
and had even caused DC to be the last jurisdiction to adopt a reciprocal law.256 Yet in the 1950s, Congress slowly began cooperating in the development of a complex federal-state partnership to
collect child support.257 Three elements are most relevant in this
decades-long collaboration. First, the federal government introduced or helped spread novel techniques to coerce enforcement,
such as revoking professional, occupational, recreational, and
drivers’ licenses; denying passport applications; and intercepting
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American Law Institute, Memorandum to Council, in Model Penal Code ix (1956).
American Law Institute, Comments to Section 207.16 – Non-Support, in Model
Penal Code 255–62 (1956).
255 For example, Wife Desertion in Ohio, Wash Post 6 (Sept 25, 1909) (describing demand for federal criminal statute); Mother’s Plight, Brooklyn Daily Eagle at 3 (cited in
note 220) (same, decades later).
256 Cassels, Running Fathers Can’t Hide Now, LA Times at A2 (cited in note 244).
257 The federal government stepped in lightly in 1950, with an amendment to the Social Security Act that required states to inform law enforcement when families received
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Hatcher, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 1041
(cited in note 29). See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, Turner v Rogers, No 10–10, *2–6 (US filed Jan 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw at
2011 WL 108380).
254
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federal tax refunds.258 Second, Congress added a federal criminal
law in 1992, which applies when a parent fails to pay an amount
greater than $5,000 over state lines for a year. 259 And third,
Congress bolstered interstate enforcement by changing federal
law and by using its spending power to incentivize states to adopt
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a modified
version of URESA. 260 Overall, federalization made support enforcement more frequent and effective, in large part by refining
and enhancing the blended civil-criminal machinery invented by
states.261 Ironically, the federal involvement reformers sought unsuccessfully for so many years now prevents the meaningful experimentation at the local and state levels that identified the
practices federal law enshrined.
C. The Shift to “Civil” Family Courts
As states refined their civil support options, rendering criminal law more a background threat, family courts appeared primarily or exclusively “civil.” Some locations broadened or replaced existing family courts to include civil nonsupport matters
through legislative change or judicial interpretation,262 while others included these laws in creating specialized courts for the first
time.263 When constitutional requirements made combining civil
and criminal jurisdiction difficult, lawmakers included only the
civil cases.264 It was unnecessary to retain criminal nonsupport in

258 Most scholars date major federal involvement to the 1970s. For a particularly helpful overview, see generally Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in
Congress and the States, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 267 (2009).
259 Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-521, § 2(a), 106 Stat 3403, 3403,
codified as amended in various sections of Title 18 and Title 42. See also generally
Kathleen A. Burdette, Comment, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child Support Enforcement after United States v. Lopez, 144 U Pa L Rev 1469 (1996) (discussing difficulties in
interstate enforcement of the 1992 Act).
260 See Margaret Campbell Haynes and Susan Friedman Paikin, “Reconciling”
FFCCSOA and UIFSA, 49 Fam L Q 331, 351 (2015).
261 On the federal government’s current role in child support enforcement, see
Patterson, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 98–101 (cited in note 3).
262 See, for example, Freeman v Freeman, 76 S2d 414 (La 1954) (construing court’s
jurisdiction over “all cases of desertion or non-support of children” to apply to “civil” cases
newly brought under URESA).
263 As of 1950, domestic relations courts existed in around thirty large cities and statewide
in a few jurisdictions, leaving many opportunities to open different types of tribunals. Boushy,
The Historical Development of the Domestic Relations Court (cited in note 16).
264 For example, F.H. McGregor, Domestic Relations Court, 15 Tex Bus J 101, 102
(1952) (discussing how after a court with combined criminal and civil jurisdiction was
found unconstitutional, the law was amended to remove criminal jurisdiction).
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reformed family courts, one expert reasoned, because “the use of
the criminal law approach is all but disappearing.” And, in the
new civil-dominant scheme, it would be beneficial to exclude criminal matters. “We want to do our best to keep out the penal law
atmosphere,” the expert explained, “with all the formal trappings
of jury trials and the rest.”265
Another influential shift was the transfer of divorce litigation. Attention to the treatment of divorce overflowed in the wake
of a post–World War II divorce wave, which merged with ongoing
concerns about the fraud and collusion used to satisfy fault
grounds.266 Pointing to juvenile courts (still more common and uncontroversial than adult-focused domestic relations courts) or revisiting the NPA’s proposal for unified family courts, legal leaders
proposed family courts with divorce jurisdiction.267 Though continuing to encounter pushback,268 this time they met with more
success in moving divorce to family courts.269 By 1960, divorce almost fully eclipsed criminal nonsupport as the primary motivation for promoting family courts.270
Meanwhile, probation officers slowly disappeared from marital litigation. Some latecomers to probation never applied the
method to family cases, while others phased it out for budgetary
reasons.271 Probation officer functions were curtailed, with the rehabilitative goals and methods eliminated. A 1953 memorandum
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Walter Gellhorn to J. Howard Rossbach, April 23, 1953 (cited in note 245).
DiFonzo, Beneath the Fault Line at 112–37 (cited in note 16); Lynne C. Halem,
Divorce Reform: Changing Legal and Social Perspectives 220 (Free Press 1980); Katherine
L. Caldwell, Not Ozzie and Harriet: Postwar Divorce and the American Liberal Welfare
State, 23 Law & Soc Inquiry 1, 27–30 (1998).
267 For a juvenile-court-inspired example, see generally Quentin Johnstone, Family
Courts, 22 U Kan City L Rev 18 (1953). For an NPA-influenced example, see Charles L.
Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 Law & Contemp Probs 49, 51–53 (1953).
268 Caldwell, 23 Law & Soc Inquiry at 31–37 (cited in note 266); Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Utah Marriage Counseling Experiment: An Account of Changes in Divorce
Law and Procedure, 7 Utah L Rev 443, 460–70 (1961).
269 For example, see Herndon Inge Jr, Domestic Relations Court in Mobile County, 9
Ala L Rev 26, 27–30 (1956) (describing domestic relations court founded primarily to
handle divorce).
270 See generally Family Courts: A Symposium, 27 Tenn L Rev 357 (1960) (reporting
on first meeting of ABA’s new Family Law Section, during which discussants supported
creation of family courts to handle divorce, with no mention of criminal nonsupport). Nine
states never combined divorce and other domestic relations matters into a unified court;
the continued separation causes racial and class differences in the resolution of disputes.
Dale Margolin Cecka, Inequity in Private Child Custody Litigation, 20 CUNY L Rev 203,
211–12 (2016).
271 For example, Kentucky lacked a probation department responsible for nonsupport
cases, prompting a defendant to argue that the USDL could not be applied to him because
266
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prepared by a social work leader, who was serving as director of
a juvenile delinquency project for the US Children’s Bureau, captures some of the reasoning behind these changes:
It appears to me that non-support is a civil action. How can
a person be placed on probation as the result of a civil action?
. . . [P]robation officers are now used primarily to insure payment. This is a great waste of money and skill. We could use
a less expensive and less qualified type of personnel to do this
work.272
Following this logic, support collection and disbursement were increasingly handled by court bureaucrats who only oversaw payments, rather than providing rehabilitative treatment.273 (For example, a family court clerk initiated the hearing that culminated
in Turner’s incarceration. The clerk’s duties included reviewing
delinquent accounts and issuing “show cause” orders for those
more than five days behind, regardless of whether the arrears
were due to a private party or the state.274)
In 1959, the NPA endorsed flexibility in family court employee titles, apparently not perceiving this move as a threat to
probation employment or else joining a foregone conclusion. In its
modified model Family Court Act, the NPA explained that it used
the vague word “assistants,” rather than “probation officer[s],” to
“permit[ ] each court to adopt a title that seems most appropriate.”275 The result was that court positions were filled by officials
who did not have training or professional identities as probation
officers.276 Some probation tasks fell by the wayside, and others
were outsourced. Family courts could refer litigants to therapists,
for instance.277 And lawyers jumped in to fill other gaps, such as
of its apparent reliance on probation enforcement. The Kentucky Court held that the lower
court could direct a clerk to perform necessary probation functions. Duncan, 262 SW2d at 376.
272 Bertram M. Beck to Allen T. Klots, July 31, 1953, Walter Gellhorn Papers, Box 19,
Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.
273 See J. Leonard Hornstein, Interrelated Roles in Child Support Enforcement, 36
Juv & Fam Ct J 111, 113 (1985) (describing how probation officers oversaw collection of
support payments).
274 Turner, 564 US at 435–36 (quotation marks omitted).
275 Standard Family Court Act, 5 Natl Probation & Parole Assn J 99, 113 (1959). The
modern organization erased its involvement in family courts from its institutional
memory. See National Council on Crime & Delinquency, History, archived at
http://perma.cc/P2NB-HL99.
276 MacDowell, 22 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 495–96 (cited in note 19) (describing modern family court staff and arguing that their discretion leaves litigants “vulnerable
to the infiltration of bias”).
277 See Family Courts Urged, Boston Globe 10 (June 29, 1967).
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representing children’s interests in divorce and custody disputes
in the much-troubled role of guardian ad litem.278 Though some
locations retain probation officers for criminal nonsupport matters to this day, these cases are such a tiny portion of litigation
that probation is hardly noticeable in modern family courts.279
Once divorce and civil nonsupport took over family court
dockets, and probation receded to the background, the courts
seemed civil, even though many used criminal-style interventions
in so-called civil matters and maintained actual jurisdiction over
criminal nonsupport. This transition obscured the criminal origins of family courts and the laws they apply.280
IV. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AND THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL
DIVIDE
That child support enforcement machinery is criminal law in
a civil guise has serious implications as a matter of principle and
practice. 281 There is widespread agreement that modern child
support enforcement is flawed.282 Scholars have raised important
questions about the financial usefulness and collateral consequences of incarcerating child support debtors.283 Careful studies
278 This was not a new role, but institutional changes and the growing divorce rate
made it more significant. See generally Dale Margolin Cecka, Improper Delegation of Judicial Authority in Child Custody Cases: Finally Overturned, 52 U Richmond L Rev 181
(2017); Amy E. Halbrook, Custody: Kids, Counsel and the Constitution, 12 Duke J Const
L & Pub Pol 179 (2017).
279 See, for example, The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court *2, 9
(Virginia’s Judicial System), archived at http://perma.cc/5Z7U-A4HU.
280 See, for example, Nadine Mason, Hubbub Marks Court of Domestic Relations, LA
Times 16 (Jan 4, 1960).
281 For a helpful overview of the current operation of the law, published in the late
stages of completing this Article, see generally Cortney Lollar, Criminalizing (Poor)
Fatherhood, 70 Ala L Rev 125 (2018).
282 See, for example, Leslie Joan Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement
Policy for Poor Families, 45 Fam L Q 157, 161 (2011); Tonya L. Brito, David J. Pate Jr,
and Jia-Hui Stefanie Wong, “I Do for My Kids”: Negotiating Race and Racial Inequality in
Family Court, 83 Fordham L Rev 3027, 3036–44 (2015).
283 See Part IV.A. One of the earliest notable entrants in this discussion was Professor
David Chambers, who relied on empirical evidence from Michigan to argue that jail, as
part of “[a]n aggressive enforcement system,” measurably increased support enforcement.
Despite this finding, Chambers questioned whether jail was a wise tactic because he
thought it could harm family relationships, looked like imprisonment for debt, and seemed
inappropriate for an intrafamily offense that disproportionately implicated poor and alcoholic fathers. David L. Chambers, Men Who Know They Are Watched: Some Benefits and
Costs of Jailing for Nonpayment of Support, 75 Mich L Rev 900, 927–34 (1977). See generally David L. Chambers, Making Fathers Pay: The Enforcement of Child Support
(Chicago 1979). Chambers’s work was recognized at the time as informative, but many
disagreed with his normative conclusions, including on feminist grounds. See, for example,
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have concluded that the Turner v Rogers majority’s provision of
“alternative procedural safeguards”284 has done little to protect indigent obligors.285 For these reasons, a new reform approach may
be warranted, yet securing change through the political process
has proven difficult.286
One possible path forward could be to return to the Court to
seek a holding that modern child support enforcement is of a criminal nature. Given the Turner majority’s limitations on the scope
of its holding, there will likely be a Turner sequel. 287 And the
Court previously expressed willingness to look beneath the civil
contempt label in the child support context. 288 The proposal to
seek a criminal classification is admittedly somewhat unsatisfying, coming after this Article has demonstrated that the civilcriminal line is artificial and malleable. While recognizing this
disjunction, the discussion proceeds from the premise that the
criminal label is too entrenched in constitutional law to discard.
Robert Mnookin, Book Review, Review: Using Jail for Child Support Enforcement,
48 U Chi L Rev 338, 369 (1981) (stating that Chambers weighed interests of single women
and their children “less heavily in his arguments than I would”). Interestingly, more recent feminist scholarship sometimes echoes Chambers in questioning the use of criminal
law and imprisonment. For discussion, see generally Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on
Crime, 92 Iowa L Rev 741 (2007).
284 The Court required that states better ensure “adequate notice of the importance
of ability to pay, fair opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information, and
court findings.” Turner, 564 US at 448.
285 See generally Elizabeth G. Patterson, Turner in the Trenches: A Study of How
Turner v. Rogers Affected Child Support Contempt Proceedings, 25 Georgetown J Poverty
L & Pol 75 (2017); Ashley Robertson, Note, Revisiting Turner v. Rogers, 69 Stan L Rev
1541 (2017). See also Margaret Brining and Marsha Garrison, Getting Blood from Stones:
Results and Policy Implications of an Empirical Investigation of Child Support Practice in
St. Joseph County, Indiana Paternity Actions, 56 Fam Ct Rev 521, 533 (2018) (finding
routine use of contempt and concluding Turner “had no apparent impact on local contempt
practice”).
286 See Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 669–71 (cited in note 14) (discussing institutional and political resistance to change in this context). It remains to be seen whether
guidelines passed by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement in 2017 will result
in real changes. On these guidelines, see Patterson, 25 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at
109–10 (cited in note 285); Brining and Garrison, 56 Fam Ct Rev at 524 (cited in note 285).
287 Turner, 564 US at 449 (different result may follow if custodial parent has a lawyer,
in “unusually complex” cases, or “where the underlying child support payment is owed to
the State”).
288 In a child support contempt case that turned on the civil-criminal line to determine
whether a statutory presumption (that the parent remained able to comply with a support
order) was unconstitutional, the Court held that a “substantiated” challenge could defeat
“the labels affixed either to the proceeding or to the relief imposed under state law.” However, it remanded the case for further proceedings on that point. Hicks v Feiock, 485 US
624, 631 (1988). The lower court then concluded that the contempt proceeding was criminal because the defendant was subject to a probationary term he could not end early
through compliance. In re Feiock, 215 Cal App 3d 141 (1990).
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It is uncertain how the Court would treat the argument that
proceedings like those in Turner should be classified as criminal.
Scholars have roundly condemned the Court for failing to develop
a principled approach to analyzing statutes that defy easy civilcriminal labeling. Discussants have responded by offering alternative tests, yet none of the proposals has secured the Court’s endorsement or a scholarly consensus.289 The history of child support enforcement provides a fresh and novel basis to reconsider
the Court’s current test and suggest improvements.290
If the Court were persuaded to categorize child support proceedings like Turner’s as criminal, state lawmakers would need
to change either procedures or punishments to align with constitutional constraints. Because of the particularly counterproductive consequences of incarcerating parents who owe child
support, the better approach would be to decriminalize most child
support proceedings through elimination of incarceration.291
A. Criminal-Derived Enforcement Methods Post-Turner
Though the full scope of incarceration for child support nonpayment is unknown, studies suggest that thousands of debtor
fathers have suffered this consequence.292 Some states’ jail populations include large contingents of these men.293 Most of these incarcerations follow civil contempt proceedings, rather than criminal prosecutions. 294 Family law scholars and sociologists have
pointed to the demographic characteristics of child support debtors and other factors to argue that it is unrealistic for some parents to comply with support orders, especially after debts begin to

289 See Steiker, 85 Georgetown L J at 809–20 (cited in note 30) (outlining three main
approaches pursued by other scholars: following legislative labels, developing a middle
ground jurisprudence, or crafting a test to identify a meaningful civil-criminal line).
290 See Part IV.B. The Part’s proposals could improve analysis in other contexts involving “civil” confinement, such as in sex offender cases like Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US
346, 361–62 (1997). For helpful criticism of the Court’s current analysis in this context,
see generally Arielle W. Tolman, Note, Sex Offender Civil Commitment to Prison PostKingsley, 113 Nw U L Rev 155 (2018).
291 See Part IV.C.
292 Elizabeth Cozzolino, Public Assistance, Relationship Context, and Jail for Child
Support Debt, 4 Socius 1, 2 (2018).
293 Id.
294 Patterson, 25 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 80 (cited in note 285) (around
15 percent of South Carolina’s jail population was being held for child support contempt).
See also Lynne Haney, Incarcerated Fatherhood: The Entanglements of Child Support
Debt and Mass Imprisonment, 124 Am J Soc 1, 28 (2018); Zatz, 39 Seattle U L Rev at 933
(cited in note 15); Cozzolino, 4 Socius at 13 (cited in note 292).
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accrue fees and interest.295 Most child support debtors live below
the poverty line, and parents who earn less than $10,000 per year
owe 70 percent of arrears.296
Before resorting to civil contempt incarceration, family courts
employ a wide range of coercive techniques, some of which require
the involvement of state and federal employees and resources in
a manner that far exceeds court involvement in typical “civil”
matters. One of the most common methods is garnishment of
wages, which can withhold up to 65 percent of fathers’ salaries.297
For men without steady incomes, this method is ineffectual.
Other possibilities include interception of tax refunds, revocation
of drivers’ licenses and occupational licenses, and denial of passports.298 Some sanctions apply automatically when debt reaches a
predetermined level. As just one example, Florida suspends child
support debtors’ drivers’ licenses when they owe $400.299
Whether these coercive methods are productive, or at least
worth the cost of implementation, is unclear. One study found
that sanctions “account for only 4% of child support collections.”300
Another suggested that “probably less than 2% of child support
collections can be associated with the threat of incarceration.”301
Reform proponents suggest that enforcement reduces fathers’ informal contributions of cash and in-kind support by more than the
enforcement secures.302 They also claim that the current approach
harms relationships between parents and discourages visits with
children.303 Child support obligors with extreme debt may turn to

295 For example, Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 617 (cited in note 14); Cammett,
Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 142–50 (cited in note 15); Patterson, 18 Cornell J L &
Pub Pol at 107–14 (cited in note 3); Haney, 124 Am J Soc at 18 (cited in note 294); Maria
Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer, and Eunhee Han, Child Support: Responsible Fatherhood and
the Quid Pro Quo, 635 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 140, 152 (2011).
296 Patterson, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 118 (cited in note 3).
297 Cammett, Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 144 (cited in note 15).
298 Id at 130, 144–45; Patterson, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 100–01 (cited in note 3).
299 Haney, 124 Am J Soc at 27 (cited in note 294); Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as
Fathers: The Courts, the Law and Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 Cardozo L
Rev 511, 531–34 (2013).
300 Haney, 124 Am J Soc at 27 (cited in note 294). See also Cancian, Meyer, and Han,
635 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 149 (cited in note 295) (collecting studies finding
sanctions such as loss of drivers’ license counterproductive).
301 Carmen Solomon-Fears, Alison M. Smith, and Carla Berry, Child Support
Enforcement: Incarceration as the Last Resort Penalty for Nonpayment of Support 3 (2012)
(this statistic seems to include both criminal and civil methods of incarceration).
302 Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 657 (cited in note 14).
303 Cammett, Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 130, 144–45 (cited in note 15);
Patterson, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 97 (cited in note 3).
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the underground economy or pursue illegal sources of income.304
Jailed fathers obviously earn little to no income.305 However, it is
unknown what deterrent effect these sanctions may hold for other
obligor parents.
The state and federal governments have direct financial
stakes or foreseeable interests in the outcome of many support
cases because of connections between support enforcement and
welfare benefits. When a custodial parent applies for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or other government assistance, the state automatically opens a child support case
against the noncustodial parent to seek reimbursement for these
costs. Many men’s support payments go entirely toward reimbursing the government for these benefits. 306 According to one
scholar: “About half of the child support caseload consists of families with histories of current (10 percent) or prior (40 percent)
welfare receipt.”307 Between 20 and 25 percent of the more than
$100 billion in child support arrears is due to the government.308
All states and the federal government also maintain fullfledged criminal nonsupport laws.309 These laws provide sanctions
similar or even identical to those authorized in family court civil
contempt statutes,310 yet they rarely serve as the basis for child
support incarceration. 311 The selective application of criminal
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Haney, 124 Am J Soc at 29 (cited in note 294).
Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 658–59 (cited in note 14).
306 Cozzolino, 4 Socius at 4 (cited in note 292); Cammett, Georgetown J Poverty L &
Pol at 129 (cited in note 15).
307 Cozzolino, 4 Socius at 3 (cited in note 292).
308 See id; Who Owes Child Support Debt? (Office of Child Support Enforcement, Sept 15,
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/9Z8V-QDMF. The Turner majority cited a statistic from 2004
that around half of arrears are owed to the government. Turner, 564 US at 446–47.
309 On the retention of criminal law, see Part III.B. For a list of current statutes, see
Criminal Nonsupport and Child Support (National Conference of State Legislatures, June
6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9ZJQ-8BCK.
310 For instance, South Carolina’s criminal nonsupport statute and family court civil
contempt statute both provide for incarceration for up to a year and a fine of $1,500
(though only the contempt statute allows a public works sentence of up to three hundred
hours). Compare SC Code Ann § 63-5-20, with SC Code Ann § 63-3-620.
311 Brief of Center for Family Policy and Practice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Turner v Rogers, No 10-10, *21–22 (US filed Jan 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw
at 2011 WL 141222); Steven Cook and Jennifer L. Noyes, The Use of Civil Contempt and
Criminal Nonsupport as Child Enforcement Tools: A Report on Local Perspectives and the
Availability of Data *12–13 (University of Wisconsin-Madison, May 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/8SU3-WSR7.
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laws renders them a valuable tool in the child support enforcement arsenal.312 These laws provide a criminal backbone—deterrence, stigma, extradition, and the possibility of criminal conviction—to the purported civil scheme.
The government’s civil and criminal coercive tools are not
limited to those cases in which it is the direct beneficiary.313 Rather, the longstanding entanglement of public and private goals
in securing family support has justified substantial overlap in the
enforcement options for “private” and “public” cases. 314 The involvement of family court staff and routine use of contempt incarceration, backed by the selective use of nonsupport laws labeled
criminal, raises weighty questions about the nature of modern
child support law for purposes of assigning procedural
protections.
B. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Civil-Criminal
Divide
The opinions in Turner began from the unquestioned premise
that the defendant was subject to incarceration for civil contempt,
thus not qualifying for the significant protections required in
criminal prosecutions or even the lesser procedures guaranteed
for criminal contempt hearings. When the Court revisits child
support enforcement, it could instead start by asking whether
such enforcement is civil or criminal. A criminal label matters not
only for the right to counsel but also for the burden of proof and
persuasion, the rights to a jury trial and against selfincrimination, and myriad other reasons.315
There are two paths the Court’s civil-versus-criminal analysis is most likely to take: a narrow focus on contempt or a broader
test that the Court has employed when evaluating the nature of

312 See Teresa A. Myers, Courts Uphold Criminal Penalties for Failure to Pay Child
Support (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2008), archived at
http://perma.cc/6V4H-PL7Y; Solomon-Fears, Smith, and Berry, Child Support Enforcement at 11 (cited in note 301).
313 Stacy Brustin and Lisa Martin, Bridging the Justice Gap in Family Law: Repurposing Federal IV-D Funding to Expand Community-Based Legal and Social Services for
Parents, 67 Hastings L J 1265, 1268 (2016).
314 Cancian, Meyer, and Han, 635 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 144 (cited in
note 295). See also Hatcher, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 1044 (cited in note 29) (explaining
how public and private child support “are now administered under one heavily regulated,
government-run system”).
315 See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and
Courts, 94 Georgetown L J 1, 3–4 (2005).
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a sanction. Scholars have identified weaknesses in both approaches.316 Consideration of how the Court’s analyses apply to
child support enforcement affirms previous critiques, finds additional reasons for skepticism, and identifies factors that may be
useful for future cases.
Beginning with the contempt-precedent approach, the Court
has long recognized that “[c]ontempts are neither wholly civil nor
altogether criminal.” 317 Nevertheless, contempt is typically divided into criminal and civil classes, with the distinction turning
on the reason for the sanction. Criminal contempt imposes a fine
or imprisonment as a punitive measure “to vindicate the authority
of the law.” By contrast, in civil contempt the incarceration is for
a remedial purpose—to coerce the offender into complying with a
court order “for the benefit of the complainant.” In civil contempt,
therefore, the person is released upon compliance; in the common
phrasing, the contemnor “carries the keys of his prison in his own
pockets.”318
The contempt evaluation is more complicated when it involves failure to comply with a court order to pay a specified
amount.319 In those cases the “ability to pay . . . marks a dividing
line between civil and criminal contempt.”320 This is because if the
person is unable to pay, contempt incarceration is ineffective at
coercion and thus cannot be cast as remedial. The Turner majority recognized the distinction between civil and criminal contempt
for nonpayment but only for the purpose of discussing whether
Turner needed a lawyer to assure “accurate decisionmaking in respect to the key ‘ability to pay’ question.” The justices emphasized
that “accuracy” regarding ability to pay was particularly important here because it marked the difference between civil and
criminal contempt. They explained: “That is because an incorrect
decision (wrongly classifying the contempt proceeding as civil)
can increase the risk of wrongful incarceration by depriving the
316 For a critique of the broader test, see, for example, id. On the unsatisfactory distinction between civil and criminal contempt, see Earl C. Dudley Jr, Getting beyond the
Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79
Va L Rev 1025 (1993).
317 Gompers v Bucks Stove & Range Co, 221 US 418, 441 (1911).
318 Id at 441–42. See also Dudley, 79 Va L Rev at 1025 (cited in note 316).
319 Relatedly, the ABA’s Turner amicus brief argued that indigent defendants facing
incarceration for contempt warranted counsel “regardless of whether the proceeding is
labeled ‘civil’ or criminal’” and described contempt for child support as a “quasi-criminal.”
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, Turner v Rogers, No 10-10, *5–7 (US filed Jan 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 118266).
320 Turner, 564 US at 445 (quotation marks omitted), citing Hicks, 485 US at 635 n 7.
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defendant of the procedural protections (including counsel) that
the Constitution would demand in a criminal proceeding.”321 Under this reasoning, the defendant’s financial situation dictates
whether he faces civil or criminal contempt, which determines
whether he gets appointed counsel, who might have been helpful
in navigating the initial civil-criminal contempt question. This
scenario demonstrates how poorly the contempt precedent, which
was largely crafted on other fact patterns (for example, deliberate
disturbance of a trial or insult to a judge),322 fits a failure-to-pay
situation.323
The contempt analysis is even more ill-fitting when applied
to indigent debtors. Few situations arise in which a person the
Court classifies as “indigent” (as they did Turner) could be held
liable for contempt for nonpayment. Though some people who are
indigent for purposes of qualifying for appointed counsel might be
able to afford their child support arrears, an unknown but probably significant portion of indigent people cannot. The latter group
is not willfully failing to comply with a court order, as is required
for a typical finding of contempt. But in the child support context,
parents are legally obligated to pay the amount a judge previously
determined they are capable of affording. Thus, a judge can find
a child support nonpayer to be both indigent and in willful violation of an order to pay.324 Still, it is hard to see how a person could
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Turner, 564 US at 445.
Joseph H. Beale Jr, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 Harv L Rev 161,
162–64 (1908) (“Typical” contempt scenarios include an “actual disturbance made in the
court itself which interferes with the process of litigation,” “direct insults to the court itself
in its presence,” and “any interference with persons or property which are in the hands of
the court.”); Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 Yale L J 83, 85 (1947)
(defining contempt as generally including acts in “disregard of the authority of the court”
or against “the integrity of the court”). See also Nature of Criminal Contempt, 25 Harv L
Rev 375, 375 (1912) (“A refusal to do justice to other parties in equity suits thus came to
be known as civil contempt, although it is not inherently a contempt of court at all. Confusion has inevitably arisen.”). More research is warranted on the seeming expansion of
the use of contempt in the twentieth century.
323 Turner’s brief makes a similar point to support the argument that counsel is
needed in order to retain the proceeding’s civil character. Brief for Petitioner, Turner v
Rogers, No 10-10, *42 (US filed Jan 4, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 49898)
(“[T]he state court’s reasoning is fatally circular: the court relied on the defendant’s presumed ability to purge his contempt to justify the absence of an essential procedural safeguard at the contempt hearing, the very purpose of which was to determine whether the
defendant had the ability to purge his contempt.”).
324 See Sickler v Sickler, 878 NW2d 549, 561–62 (Neb 2016) (explaining that “[m]ost
courts do not allow ‘nonpayment contempt’” because of state constitutional bans on imprisonment for debt, but child support is excluded from this rule because it is regarded as
a public duty rather than a private debt). See also Note, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons
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be held in civil contempt if he lacks the present means of complying. (Turner, for instance, was classed as indigent and needed to
purge arrears of nearly $6,000.325)
One way forward could be for the Court to recognize proceedings like those in Turner as criminal contempt hearings. Such a
holding would attach some criminal procedure protections.326 Theoretically this would be a step in the right direction, heightening
procedural safeguards to match the nature of the proceeding and
severity of the sanction. In practice, this move would have undesirable consequences. Either family courts would need to treat all
child support contempt hearings as criminal in nature, which is
overinclusive based on the definition of criminal contempt, or else
they would still face the dilemma of determining obligors’ present
ability to comply with support orders prior to holding contempt
hearings.
Given the unconvincing application of the Court’s contempt
precedent to child support enforcement, the Court might instead
look to the test it has developed for distinguishing between civil
and criminal statutes more generally. Applying this broader
analysis is appropriate because, unlike most contempt scenarios,
contempt for child support nonpayment is—in the Court’s own
words and as supported by this Article—“one part of a highly complex system.” 327 It is thus misleading to evaluate the contempt
proceeding in isolation.
The Court’s test for distinguishing between civil and criminal
statutes has been roundly condemned, perhaps most memorably
as “a jurisprudential Frankenstein’s monster—a patchwork assembled from disparate parts, unwieldy and unpredictable, and
suffering from a distressing but justified inquietude about its reason for existing.”328 The test consists of two parts. First, the Court
“must ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” If so, the Court next considers whether
the scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate

and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 Harv L Rev 1024, 1036 (2016). For assessments of other
scenarios potentially leading to imprisonment for debt, see generally Lea Shepard, Creditor’s Contempt, 2011 BYU L Rev 1509; Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice
Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 Md L Rev 486 (2016); Tamar R. Birckhead, The
New Peonage, 72 Wash & Lee L Rev 1595 (2015); Christopher D. Hampson, The New
American Debtors’ Prisons, 44 Am J Crim L 1 (2017).
325 Turner, 564 US at 437.
326 International Union v Bagwell, 512 US 821, 826–27 (1994).
327 Turner, 564 US at 443.
328 Fellmeth, 94 Georgetown L J at 10 (cited in note 315).
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legislative intent, and “only the clearest proof will suffice to override intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”329 For this analysis, the Court has
provided seven non-exhaustive and non-dispositive “guideposts.”330 Even when first outlining the guideposts, the Court recognized they “may often point in differing directions,” and the
Court has subsequently applied them selectively and
inconsistently.331 Thus, it is not clear that the test does more than
provide a weak patina of standardized analysis.332
Applying the test to the child support context exposes its deficiencies and demonstrates how it may undermine legal principles and procedural justice goals.333 The problems in application
begin from the first step—ascertaining whether the legislature
meant to establish civil proceedings. Here the Court often relies
on states’ labels or the placement of laws in civil versus criminal
codes.334 Such deference permits legislatures to skirt criminal procedure protections. This concern is not merely hypothetical. As
this account details, at least some states recast criminal family
support prosecutions as civil proceedings to reduce expensive and
time-consuming procedural protections, while retaining criminalstyle enforcement powers.335 The Court’s reliance on state labels
could also mean that it would perversely allow disparate procedural protections for identical proceedings held in different
states.336 As a practical matter, the Court should not unquestioningly accept a “civil” categorization on the mistaken assumption
329

Smith v Doe, 538 US 84, 92 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168–69 (1963).
331 Id at 169. See also, for example, Smith, 538 US at 97 (finding only five factors
relevant).
332 Issachar Rosen-Zvi and Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 Va L
Rev 79, 126 (2008) (“Although the multifaceted test has been invoked frequently, it has
likely never determined an outcome, not even in [the original] case itself.”).
333 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S Cal L Rev 1313, 1352, 1362–63
(2012) (identifying “core values served by criminal adjudication . . . legality, evidentiary
accuracy, and fair process” and discussing procedural justice implications); Collins, 90
NYU L Rev at 447 (cited in note 21) (discussing criminal law interests in legitimacy and
fairness).
334 See, for example, Smith, 538 US at 92–93. But see Sessions v Dimaya, 138 S Ct
1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch concurring) (“[T]he happenstance that a law is found in a civil
or criminal part of the statute books cannot be dispositive.”).
335 See Part III.
336 See Nowakowski v New York, 835 F3d 210, 220 (2d Cir 2016) (Variances in state
labels for identical offenses “counsel against adopting a purely labels-dependent approach
to our analysis. If we were to do otherwise, federal jurisdiction . . . arising from similar or
identical conduct and punishment would be controlled by vagaries of nomenclature, not
substance.”).
330
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that “civil” law is less harsh.337 The shift to civil can bring netwidening consequences and attach nearly identical punishments
devoid of procedural protections.338
Relying less on state labels places more weight on the second
part of the test, which scholars have also persuasively critiqued.
This step uses seven guideposts to assess the characteristics of
the sanction. Applying these factors to child support incarceration
illustrates how unhelpful they are for securing predictable and
consistent results. The first two guideposts can be addressed together. They are: (1) “Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,” and (2) “whether it has historically
been regarded as a punishment.”339 Incarceration is an affirmative restraint and a classic, paradigmatic criminal sanction, yet
the Court has been unwilling to recognize it as such in the contempt context because of the supposedly remedial purpose.
Guidepost three, “whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter,” fits awkwardly here; the Court included this factor to
tease out the difference between customs fees and taxes versus
monetary penalties, with only the latter requiring scienter. 340
Guideposts four and six can also be taken together: (4) “whether
its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence” and (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for
it.”341 Deterrence has long been a key rationale for incarcerating
nonsupporters, and there have been hints of retribution and criminal-style stigmatization (“deadbeat dads”) as well, yet remediation is at least theoretically a core goal. Guidepost five is “whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime.”342 The Court’s
application of this factor has never been clear, and it is uncertain
how it would play out in a situation such as this, when criminal
laws addressing the same conduct preceded, were interlaced with,
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See Parts III.A and IV.B.
Alexandra Natapoff offers an analogous argument involving the shift from felonies
to misdemeanors. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization,
68 Vand L Rev 1055 (2015).
339 Kennedy, 372 US at 168.
340 Id (citing cases involving taxes and customs fees for this guidepost).
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and followed civil support statutes.343 Finally, the seventh guidepost, “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned,” is debatable.344
Thus, while there are solid arguments that the Court should
and perhaps would classify child support incarceration as a criminal sanction—especially based on the research presented in this
Article—the seven factors do not guarantee that result.345 That
the test might not recognize nonsupport incarceration as a criminal sanction effectively endorses legislatures’ ability to relabel
their criminal laws as civil, a strategy they could (and arguably
do) employ in countless contexts.346
While a comprehensive reassessment of the guideposts is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth drawing from child support history to identify a critical aspect of statutory schemes that
these factors omit: the machinery that secures and imposes the
sanction.347 Criminal procedure protections were enacted to protect individuals from the powers of the state.348 The involvement
of government officials from start to finish in child support enforcement, in combination with the admitted public interests at
stake, distinguishes this statutory scheme from other types of socalled civil contempt incarceration. In the words of the Turner
majority: “The Federal Government has created an elaborate procedural mechanism designed to help both the government and the

343 For an example of how this factor can cut both ways, see United States v Ward,
448 US 242, 250 (1980) (When a civil statute applied to the “precise conduct” criminalized
in an earlier statute, the fifth guidepost pointed to finding the civil statute “criminal in
nature . . . at first blush.” However, “we believe that the placement of criminal penalties
in one statute and the placement of civil penalties in another statute enacted 70 years
later tends to dilute the force of the fifth . . . criterion in this case.”).
344 Kennedy, 372 US at 168.
345 In Smith, the majority opinion suggests: “A historical survey can be useful because
a State that decides to punish an individual is likely to select a means deemed punitive in
our tradition, so that the public will recognize it as such.” Smith, 538 US at 97.
346 Fellmeth, 94 Georgetown L J at 5–6 (cited in note 315) (listing examples). Alan
Dershowitz describes a “labeling game” from the late 1930s. After the Michigan Supreme
Court struck down a criminal-style law that permitted confinement of certain sex offenders without full criminal procedure safeguards, the state legislature essentially passed the
law again in a different part of the state code and made various changes that facilitated
commitment. The Court upheld this new “civil” law, which “provided far fewer safeguards
and far harsher consequences.” Alan M. Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested
Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 51 Tex L Rev 1277, 1300–01 (1973).
347 Compare with Brooke D. Coleman, Prison Is Prison, 88 Notre Dame L Rev 2399,
2437–38 (2013) (emphasizing “the degree of government power” as relevant to procedural
protections but stopping short of recasting child support as criminal).
348 Klein, 2 Buff Crim L Rev at 691 (cited in note 30).
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custodial parents to secure payments to which they are entitled.”349 Especially when the sanction at issue is incarceration, it
should be highly relevant whether government officials are literally or effectively the opposing party.350
C. Potential Consequences of the Criminal Label for Child
Support Enforcement
If the Court were persuaded to identify modern child support
enforcement methods as criminal, that holding would not provide
a straightforward solution. Rather, lawmakers would then need
to decide whether to attach constitutionally mandated criminal
procedure protections or change their statutory scheme to decriminalize child support enforcement. How state legislators could decriminalize child support enforcement would depend on the details of the Court’s decision, but certainly the elimination of
incarceration could be a major factor in crafting a “civil” regime.
Prosecutors could then still rely on the criminal-labeled laws all
states retain to pursue incarceration of the worst offenders; in
these proceedings, criminal procedure protections would attach.
Though it is hard to predict which path lawmakers might
choose, there is at least some reason to be optimistic that the costs
of additional procedures would lead to decriminalization.351 The
clearest evidence may be that states already have criminal (typically misdemeanor) laws on the books for nonsupport and yet
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Turner, 564 US at 444 (emphasis added).
Because incarceration is such a severe and paradigmatic sanction, some discussants have proposed that a better approach is for incarceration itself to be the litmus test
for the provision of state-appointed counsel. Coleman, 88 Notre Dame L Rev at 2455 (cited
in note 347); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner,
Turner v Rogers, No 10-10, *6 (US filed Jan 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL
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125 Yale L J 2446, 2492–96 (2016) (arguing against conflation of punitive/nonpunitive
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351 Compare with Natapoff, 68 Vand L Rev at 1101 (cited in note 338) (describing how
resource constraints attach in the criminal context). But see Birckhead, 72 Wash & Lee L
Rev at 1653 (cited in note 324) (“[S]tates rarely examine the fiscal and personnel costs
incurred by courts and municipalities to administer collection mechanisms that fail to exempt the indigent.”).
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rarely use them, presumably in large part because of the added
costs and difficulties associated with criminal law and because
prosecutors prioritize other types of cases.352 Whereas states can
anticipate recouping or even profiting from “user fees” for public
defenders and jail stays after prosecuting other low-level
crimes, 353 in the child support context, the profit incentive is
undermined by the fact that these offenders already owe large
debts, including to the state.354
On the other hand, because of the complexities of federalstate cost and benefit sharing in support enforcement, as well as
fractured interests at the local level, it is possible that decisionmakers would not holistically evaluate the efficiency of the statutory scheme.355 Since the federal-state partnership began in the
1970s, there have been lengthy periods in which pursuit of publicbenefits reimbursements from fathers resulted in a net loss, even
as some (but not all) states enjoyed a net gain.356 Another cost disjuncture may be present specifically for incarceration. Even if incarceration costs more than it prompts parents to pay, the relevant decision-makers may not bear these expenses or be fully

352 See generally Cook and Noyes, The Use of Civil Contempt and Criminal Nonsupport as Child Enforcement Tools (cited in note 311). See also Ronald R. Tweel, Elizabeth
P. Coughter, and Jason P. Seiden, Family Law, 46 U Richmond L Rev 145, 165 (2011)
(observing that Virginia’s criminal nonsupport statute was “almost abandoned by most
courts and litigants” because of “criminal burden of proof problems”). On the other hand,
state legislatures could revise criminal statutes to make convictions easier, such as by
converting the offenses to strict liability. For discussion of statutory changes along these
lines, see State v Meacham, 470 SW3d 744 (Mo 2015) (en banc) (construing statutory
amendment that converted element “without good cause” into an affirmative defense);
People v Likine, 823 NW2d 50 (Mich 2012) (construing revised statute containing “no fault
or intent element”); State v Clark, 24 So2d 72 (La 1945) (construing revised statute that
deleted “without just cause”).
353 Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 Duke L J 1381, 1404–05, 1423–
25 (2018); Wayne A. Logan and Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice,
2014 U Ill L Rev 1175.
354 See Part IV.A.
355 Brito, 15 J Gender Race & Just at 668 (cited in note 14) (child support incarceration costs “are partly externalized” by child support agencies because they are born by
states’ judicial and criminal justice systems); Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and
the Real Costs of Policing, 90 NYU L Rev 870 (2015) (exploring how federal programs can
skew the financial incentives of local actors in harmful ways).
356 These calculations do not take account of the more successful use of the same machinery for families not receiving welfare. Hatcher, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 1072–73
(cited in note 29).
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aware of them.357 An unknown consideration is what value legislatures place on vindicating the state’s authority and inculcating
norms about appropriate fatherly behavior.
There is a real risk that if the Court held the current child
support enforcement approach to be criminal, some states would
not move to decriminalize it. In that scenario, child support debtors could be left in a worse position. Those found guilty would face
the stigma, reduced employment prospects, and other collateral
consequences of a criminal record, without necessarily gaining
meaningful procedural protections. 358 While fully recognizing
these harmful consequences, it is worth recalling the downsides
to the current legal scheme as well as the broader principles at
stake. Recognizing the ongoing criminal character of child support enforcement forces an honest reckoning with the operation
of the law.
CONCLUSION
It is no longer possible to remain under the delusion that
modern child support enforcement is “civil” in a meaningful
sense. For more than one hundred years, policymakers have carefully fashioned family support laws, and the courts that enforce
them, to maximize compliance with minimal cost and procedure.
In this process, they knitted strands of civil and criminal law into
an intricate tapestry. Whereas the early twentieth century
dressed up what had been civil family support suits with the armor of criminal law, twenty-first-century child support wears civil
garb that conceals criminal layers and seams in plain sight. This
intricate interlacing is due for unraveling so that a more fair and
effective system can be designed.

357 Jain, 67 Duke L J 138 at 1425 (cited in note 353) (“[T]he perspective that matters
is not that of the ‘state’ in the aggregate. Rather, it is the perspective of the front-line
actors responsible for making key decisions.”).
358 Scholarship on the treatment of misdemeanors—which is likely how this offense
would be classified—documents summary proceedings that lack effective procedural protections and impose harmful collateral consequences and costs. See especially Natapoff,
85 S Cal L Rev at 1313 (cited in note 333); Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 Iowa L
Rev 1929, 1929–30 (2014); Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98
BU L Rev 953 (2018).

